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Abstract
Many states in India have time and again elected a multiparty or a coalition government. Research so
far has shown that these differences in political cohesiveness of the ruling political entity has influenced
the spending choices of the state governments. However, the evidence is not completely conclusive.
Different authors have used different measures of political fragmentation deriving opposite results for
their effect on state government spending. There are also differences in the way economists and politi-
cal scientists have dealt with the issue econometrically. This is coupled with a lack of a theoretical model
of choice of public spending under alternative political regimes in the Indian context. I address these
gaps in the literature by first building a theoretical model of spending policies of a state government. In
this model, extensiveness and intensity of credit constraints influences equilibrium voting policies and
hence the spending policies of governments in power. The resulting predictions are then comprehen-
sively tested using data on seventeen Indian states over the period of twenty years. The econometric
analysis provides substantive evidence for the importance of political factors in determining govern-
ment spending. Specifically, we find that that politically less cohesive governments tend to spend more
on education than their more cohesive counterparts. There is also some evidence on electoral cycles in
health expenditure. Further, the analysis supports the model’s underlying notion of credit constrained
voters determining the spending policies of the government via the degree of political cohesiveness of
the government in power.
JEL Codes: E62, H72.
Keywords: political economy, government spending, credit constraints and voting, differentiated
election platforms, coalition governments in India.
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1. Introduction
Many states in India have time and again elected a multiparty or a coalition government. Given that much
of the policy making in a democratic country happens in the political realm, the degree of political cohe-
sion of a government can be argued to be influential in deciding the level and composition of spending.
However, would such argument hold reign if subjected to a rigorous theoretical and empirical analysis?
Exploring the answer to this question is the main focus of this paper. Because state government spend-
ing contributes significantly to the fiscal burden of the central government, such exploration can unravel
political underpinnings of the conduct of monetary policy as well. In this sense, the analysis in this paper
also concerns itself with the fiscal aspects of the Leviathan monetary policy dealt with in Waknis (2011).
The empirical analysis so far has shown that coalition governments do spend differently than single
party governments. Specifically, two out of three studies cited below show that coalition governments
spend more on education than the single party governments. Various reasons have been conjectured
for this behavior including a heterogenous constituency or higher visibility of certain category of voters
over others, etc. A more interesting reason from the macroeconomic perspective has been suggested
by Saez and Sinha (2009). They posit a Polanyi mechanism at work causing this differentiated spending
patterns. Karl Polanyi 1, while writing about the transition from traditional economies to market liberal-
ization, suggested that market pressures may lead to more demands for protection and insurance. This
certainly makes sense in the case of developing countries like India. The coexistence of substantial in-
equities along with impressive economic growth, makes such demands from people not equipped to deal
with the uncertainty that a market economy brings along, quite plausible. This is not just a conjecture but
something that seems to be borne out by data. For example, Ghate et al. (2011) document that post 1990
the properties of Indian business cycle closely approximate those in the developed economies. Such fluc-
tuations can definitely be argued as being income shocks to the economy, which without any insurance
mechanism to rely on, can certainly be accentuated.
So how do people respond to these changed circumstances. How do they smooth consumption when
they lack access to insurance-social or otherwise-in the presence of increased fluctuations in economic
activity? One answer to this question, is the use of voting power to secure government spending on the
required public goods to do so. In India we see this happening through examples of political responses
in terms of cash based relief programs, improved water supply and sanitation facilities, mid day meal
schemes for kids, etc. There are also few studies that seem to support this conjecture about interaction
between politicians and voters. For example Tandon (2007) uses the tariff reforms of 1990 to show that
politicians responded to the differential impact of the reforms and that such policies significantly affected
the voting response. Cole et al. (2008) show that politicians or governments respond to weather shocks
1First published in 1944, Polanyi (2001) is an analytical account of the transformation of traditional economies embedded in
social systems to a more market based systems. Although the book primarily talks about the European economies before and after
the Industrial revolution, the analysis can be argued to be relevant to today’s many transition and emerging economies including
India.
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and this in turn affects the voter’s response to the incumbent governments. I use this idea of reliance
on government spending for smoothing consumption by credit constrained voters to develop a theory of
nature of state spending conditional on the type of government.
The model includes a two period endowment economy where some of the agents are credit con-
strained. Presence of aggregate shocks to endowments and credit constraints means that more and more
people would need to rely on some insurance mechanism or support to smooth consumption. Govern-
ment expenditure on local public goods like education, health and irrigation could be an example of such
expenditure. In the model, political parties contesting elections float differentiated election platforms
prior to the realization of shocks. The national party contests the election based on an ideological plat-
form, while the coalition of national and regional parties does so on a economic policy based platform.
In an ideologically determined spending agenda, the focus is on expenditure which may not may not
address specific needs of the voters. However, an economic policy based platform explicitly focusses on
local public goods requirements of voters. The preferences of voters are such that differentiated platforms
survive in equilibrium and voters are not indifferent between them unlike in a Downsian model. Agents
vote after the realization of shocks to smooth consumption. A negative shock ensures that majority of
voters become credit constrained and vote for a coalition government. A positive shock would imply the
opposite. We assume that once elected, the respective party implements its advertised spending policies.
The theory delivers clear predictions not only about the relationship between degree of political co-
hesiveness and government spending but also about the emergence of certain type of government in the
first place. I use these predictions of the model to test against the expenditure data of 17 Indian states
for the period of 20 years. The reason to conduct another econometric analysis is that the existing results
are not completely without problems. Chaudhuri and Dasgupta (2006) and Lalvani (2005) use different
measures of political fragmentation and come to contradictory results in terms of education spending as
well as current and capital account spending. The third paper, Saez and Sinha (2009), corrects the course
by including various measures of political fragmentation and confirms that coalition governments spend
more on education. But it uses only one econometric methodology to do so and hence does not provide
the required robustness for the results. This constitutes a valid criticism because of the nature of data
set being analyzed. We have a data panel with number of states less than the number of years which is
sometimes referred to as a long panel (Cameron and Trivedi (2010)). The theoretical debate on an ap-
propriate method to analyze such a data set is anything but settled. Such data sets are common in the
study of political economy and have been used before by political scientists as well as economists often
employing different methods. By using multiple methods of statistical analysis, we improve upon these
studies by using a variety of suggested statistical methods to check the sensitivity of results to the under-
lying methodology. Along with additional interesting results on other expenditure categories, we do find
substantial evidence that a higher degree of political fragmentation is associated with a higher spending
on education. .
Thus, this paper not only offers a theory of government spending conditional on degree of political
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cohesiveness but also provides a clearer and comprehensive econometric analysis of state spending in
India. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the model. Section 3 presents the
econometric analysis of expenditure patterns of the state governments based on the predictions of the
model. Section 4 looks at the question of what determines the likelihood of having a coalition govern-
ment. Section 5 concludes.
2. Model
Consider a two period endowment economy populated with a continuum of agents. At the start of every
period agents receive an endowment ωit. There is borrowing and lending in the economy. A part of the
endowment has to be used as a collateral for borrowing in the credit market. There is inequality in the
initial endowment distribution and hence some of the agents might be credit constrained. The economy
is subject to aggregate shocks on endowments. Let ω¯ be the level of endowment, which divides the agents
into being credit constrained and not credit constrained. A negative shock shifts the initial distribution of
endowments more to the left of ω¯ increasing the number of credit constrained agents in the population
and positive shock has the opposite effect. However, at any given point the distribution of either agents
is never degenerate. These changes in initial endowments affect the distribution of voter preferences to
be discussed below.
2.1. Agents
All Agents are risk averse. After receiving the endowment (ωi1) agents face aggregate shocks which af-
fect them differentially depending on severity of their credit constraints. Let the probability where an
agent’s endowment could be destroyed be ψ. This makes (1 − ψ) as the probability with which, the en-
dowment could stay at the pre shock level. The economy ends at the end of the second period. Non
credit constrained agents enter the credit market and trade to smooth consumption. Credit constrained
voters depend on availability of local public goods for consumption smoothing. Production of the public
goods is financed by a distortionary tax on the non-credit constrained agents. Examples of typical local
public goods would be improved schools, introduction of meal schemes in the schools, improved health
access,etc. These are visible and easily targetable expenditures and hence could be used for smoothing
consumption by credit constrained agents.
Agents seek to optimize the expected value of life time consumption, where the expectation is con-
ditioned on the distribution of shocks. Agents cannot enter into any contract before the realization of
shocks and hence there is no private insurance market.
Agents solve the following problem as an economic entity:
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RBit−1 ≤ ωit+1 (3)
where, Bt is the number of bonds in period t and R is the price price of bonds in the credit market. τ is
a distortionary tax on non-credit constrained agents and TR is the transfer. The expectation is over the
distribution of shocks.
Agents who enter the credit market buy and sell bonds at the price R. Agents behave competitively
in this market and hence take R as given. Because borrowing needs collateral, the maximum an agent
can borrow is given by the available initial endowment, i.e., RBt−1 ≤ ωit+1. Thus, credit constrained
consumers will have positive net transfers and no bonds, while non credit constrained voters will have
bonds and taxes/negative net transfers in their budget constraint. We could understand the agents in this
economy as those in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)- farmers and gatherers. Post shock some farmers need
to go to the credit market but only few are left with any land to use as collateral in the credit market. The
remaining become almost or completely landless losing access to the credit market.
Agents as voters care about ideology as well as economic policy. Having certain ideology would mean
having specific preferences about social and economic justice and caring about the economic policy
would imply caring about what kind of public goods are provided by using taxes. Accordingly, credit
constrained voters would care about economic policy more than ideology and vice versa.
2.2. Political Aspects
There are two entities contesting an election, S and R, to form a government at the state level. S refers to
a single party with a national presence andR to a coalition of regional and/or national parties. The single
party has an ideologically motivated election platform and the coalition has one promising provision of
local public goods. Let fj ∈ F be the fixed characteristic of entity j and aj ∈ A be the policy variable
that the entities are free to choose. We will assume that fS is being expert in national issues and politics
and fR as having expertise in assessing local public goods requirements. The policies that these parties
choose will be aS and aR
Usually in Downsian style models with or without probabilistic voting, we get a result of policy conver-
gence. In equilibrium, the competing candidates or parties choose the same policies and voters become
indifferent between candidates (see Persson and Tabellini (2002) for details). However, in this model we
would expect differentiated platforms in equilibrium and voters to be not indifferent between candidates.
This approximates the reality where candidates rarely choose similar platforms and voters certainly seem
to favor one candidate over other (Krasa and Polborn (2010)).
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There have been two ways in which such divergence has been achieved in theory. One way is to as-
sume limited information on candidates in a Downsian setup and the other provided by Krasa and Pol-
born (2009) and Krasa and Polborn (2010). In the former paper, the authors specify conditions under
which one could have a divergence and in the later they develop a model with multidimensional policy
and a binary policy model which is capable of having convergence as well as divergence under clearly
defined conditions. In what follows, we adapt an example economy from Krasa and Polborn (2009) to
illustrate the choice of spending conditional on type of government. .
Uncertainty about voter preferences is described by a probability space (Ω,D, µ): A state ω ∈ Ω de-
termines voters preferences over F × A, and µ is the probability distribution of these preference shocks,
whileD is the set of measurable events. The preference shocks basically act as a counterpart to the distri-
bution of income shocks given by ψ. Given these shocks, voters can be differentiated on the basis of their
preferences as follows:
Type S (fS , aS)  (fR, aR)  (fS , aR)  (fR, aS)
Type R (fR, aR)  (fS , aS)  (fR, aS)  (fS , aR)
The above preference ranking means that a particular type of voter prefers the candidate of the par-
ticular characteristic and would like him or her to implement a policy consistent with his or her type.
This is an example of what Krasa and Polborn (2009) call non-Uniform Candidate Ranking preferences.
Preferences on F × A are said to satisfy uniform candidate ranking if for all fo, f1 ∈ F and all a, a′ ∈ A,
(f0, a)  (f1, a) if and only if (f0, a′)  (f1, a′). Models in Downsian tradition with candidates without
fixed characteristics satisfy UCR. Given this, Type S voters would primarily be not credit constrained and
Type R voters be credit constrained. Though, there might be a certain number of voters who definitely be-
long to either of the groups, post shock realization there are some voters who migrate to opposite groups
depending on if they become credit constrained or not(swing voters).
2.3. Competitive equilibrium and the implied voting rules
Definition 1. A competitive equilibrium for this economy is a list of allocations of endowments, debt and
consumption of credit constrained and non credit constrained agents such that 1)agents maximize the util-
ity given the distribution of shocks and the budget constraint and 2)given the credit limit based on the initial
value of the endowment, the price of bonds clears the credit markets.
We use the above definition of competitive equilibrium to derive the equilibrium voting rules. Let the
optimal life time consumption implied when the distribution of shocks is degenerate be C˜i and W (ωi)
be the associated indirect utility function. We can think of this level of consumption as something like
permanent consumption for an agent or consumption associated with some linear combination of ω¯.
Given this, the voters will populate either groups (credit constrained or not credit constrained) depending
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on the following decision rules derived from the comparison of optimization problem and the definition
of the competitive equilibrium.
Proposition 1. (Utility Maximization and Voting Rules): Given the description so far, the voters’ maxi-
mization problem implies the following decision rules for voting:
V b =

Ri if W˜ (ωi,Ψ) < W (ω¯i)
Si if W˜ (ωi,Ψ) ≥W (ω¯i)
(4)
V nb =

Si if W˜ (ωi,Ψ) < W (ω¯i)
Si if W˜ (ωi,Ψ) ≥W (ω¯i)
(5)
where V b and V nb are voters types who are credit constrained and not credit constrained respectively.
Proof of Proposition 1. If there were no shocks, then given the endowments the agents would solve the
utility maximization problem for the optimal choice of consumption every period. Such choice would
depend on the endowment and hence would change from individual to individual. A shortfall from such
an optimal choice (C¯i) would not matter for the voters who are not credit constrained and hence they
will vote based on ideology rather than economic policy. However, credit constrained voters will have to
vote depending on how their consumption in presence of shocks compares to their C¯i. A short fall means
that they become dependent on government expenditure to smooth consumption and therefore will vote
based on economic policy than ideology. QED.
We assume that events follow a particular sequence.
1. Parties communicate election platforms.
2. Voters realize idiosyncratic shocks.
3. Elections are held and people vote.
4. A Government is formed.
5. Policy is implemented.
6. Agents make their consumption decisions.
With the above details and sequence of events and given that a coalition government in this model
emerges because majority of voters become borrowing constrained as a result of a negative income shock,
the following statements hold:
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Proposition 2. (Political Equilibrium):
1. With probability ψ, there would be a coalition government of one national party and one or more
regional parties. The spending policy implemented will include higher expenditure on the local public
goods targeted at the member regional party’s constituency.
2. With probability (1−ψ) there will be a single party government and the spending policy implemented
would be according to the ideologically motivated election platform of the national party in office.
Proof of Proposition 2. It follows from Proposition 1 that the type of government is conditional on the
type of shocks realized. If the shocks are positive, we have a majority vote for a single party government
and if the shocks are negative, the majority vote goes to coalition of regional parties. This emphasizes the
role of credit constrained voters as swing voters and that the probability of having a single party or coali-
tion government depends on the probability of type of shock. Note that a positive probability for shocks
implies that the presence of swing voters (credit constrained or not depending on shocks) and ensures
that each type of voter group could end up as pivotal. Because we assume that the policies are imple-
mented and in equilibrium the parties contesting elections choose differentiated policies, the nature of
actual spending depends on who is in power.
QED.
Once the type of government is determined based on the probability of shocks and existence of credit
constrained voters, the spending policies are implemented by whichever political entity is voted into
power. If a coalition government is voted to power then we can expect the spending on local public goods
like education and healthcare access to go up. If a single party government comes to power then spending
policies will reflect the ideological preferences than being responsive to local public goods needs. In the
empirical analysis that follows we test these implications of Propositions 1 and 2. We test for differences in
spending patterns conditional on the type of government as well as what affects the probability of having
a particular type of government in the first place.
3. Econometric Analysis of the Spending Patters
In this section we test propositions 1 and 2, using data on 17 Indian states for the period of 1980-2000.
This paper is definitely not the first attempt to do so. Among a few studies on the political budget cy-
cles in India, Chaudhuri and Dasgupta (2006), Lalvani (2005), and Saez and Sinha (2009) specifically talk
about fiscal determinants of state spending in India. These studies do provide evidence that there exist
differences in the way coalition state government spend as against the single party state governments but
they are not without problems. Chaudhuri and Dasgupta (2006) and Lalvani (2005) use different mea-
sures of political fragmentation and come to contradictory results in terms of education spending as well
as current and capital account spending. Saez and Sinha (2009) correct the course by including various
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measures of political fragmentation and confirms that coalition governments spend more on education.
Though, this makes the tally in favor of positive effect of political fragmentation on education spending 2
versus 1, there are several counts on which the analysis seems incomplete.
First, though Saez and Sinha (2009) provides robustness checks by including more than one measures
of political fragmentation it does not include all the measures. It leaves out one from Chaudhuri and
Dasgupta (2006) paper. Secondly, even though being econometrically more sophisticated than the other
two papers, it does not control for GDP at all. It only has state fixed effects. As much as controlling for
unobserved heterogeneity is important, controlling for obvious differences is essential for a complete
understanding of the underlying economic processes. The econometric analysis in this paper proposes
to address this issue by using per capita state GDP as an additional control. We analyze expenditure on
education, health, irrigation, agriculture and social services.
We primarily use a data set (POLEX) created and maintained by Saez (2008) . It has the data on state
expenditure under various heads and data on various political variables on 17 Indian states. The coverage
in POLEX is limited to the states for whom data is consistently available for the period 1980-2000. It does
not contain the state GDP data. The data on per capita state GDP at constant prices for the states was
calculated from the series available in the Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy maintained by the
Reserve Bank of India on line.
Because of the nature of the data and smaller N and T (17 and 20 respectively), robustness check also
has to be in terms of the methods used. The usual panel data methods favored by the economists have
been developed to address the cases where N > T . Beck (2006) argues that in cases of N < T , it may not
be appropriate to use the panel data methods, while describing a body of statistical methods(Time series-
Cross Section(TSCS) methods) used by political scientists to study the political determinants of economic
outcomes and policies. Saez and Sinha (2009) above follow these methods. A standard modeling practice
under this methodology is to use an fixed effect model with panel corrected standard errors and a lagged
dependent variable to account for dynamics.
Studies based on such data sets are not limited to political science, however. A series of papers pio-
neered by Daren Acemoglu (Acemoglu et al. (2008, 2002)) look at the economic determinants of political
outcomes. Much of this analysis is in the mean regression framework and the data is in the TSCS form.
Alexander et al. (2011,) use a similar dataset as in Acemoglu et al. (2008) to demonstrate that a quantile
regression can in fact do better job to explain the interaction of whole distribution of economic vari-
ables and political outcomes. Though, they do not contradict the findings in later, Alexander et al. (2011,)
demonstrate that the nature of relationship between income and democracy shows significant sensitiv-
ity to income levels and disproportionately so to country specific effects. Their basic argument for using
quantile regression is thus, that it allows heterogenous marginal effects across the conditional distribu-
tion and that it affords random coefficient interpretation allowing for slope heterogeneity arising out of
non-Gaussian distributions2.
2According to the authors, the distributions of two commonly used numerical measures of democracy is bimodal.
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The debate is far from settled and hence in this paper, we follow the TSCS consensus methodology,
usual panel data methods as well as the quantile regression approach to analyze the effect of political
cohesiveness on state government spending in India. In a separate subsection we also analyze the issue of
what determines the probability that a state government has a given type of government. All this analysis
is guided by the theoretical predictions of the model in the earlier section above. Use of multiple methods
and specifications to test the hypothesis about effect of type of government on expenditure on local public
goods serves as built in robustness check for the results.
A somewhat standard practice under the TSCS methodology is to use an fixed effects model with panel
corrected standard errors and lagged dependent variable to account for dynamics Bartels (n.d.). TSCS
data sets are also referred to as the ‘long panel’, with the name ‘short panel’ reserved for N > T case.
Cameron and Trivedi (2010) state that when T > N it is necessary to specify a model for serial correlation
in the error. They suggest that the best estimator in this case is to use pooled feasible generalized least
squares estimator (PFGLS) with a distinct AR(1) process for error in each state. However, if T is not much
larger thanN , then it could lead to a finite sample bias and then it is advisable to at least use the errors still
panel corrected but for only panel level heterogeneity. To see how sensitive the estimates are to various
error processes, we run the pooled fixed effects model using various error specification process. Further,
keeping in lines with the suggestion of Cameron and Trivedi (2010), we assume an AR1 process for the
error term, while running the panel data fixed effects and random effects regressions. The command
xtregar is used to run these regressions (STATA (n.d.)).
3.1. Results
We can see that the degree of political cohesiveness as measured by effective number of votes or seats has
an unambiguous positive and significant effect on education spending under all the specifications. The
results are given in Table 1.
We repeat similar exercise for other expenditure categories and the detailed results are given in Ap-
pendix 1. The degree of political cohesiveness or the coalition dummy does not have any effect on health
expenditure under any regression specifications. However, in all regressions but one, the variable elec-
tion is significant and negatively related with health expenditure. This suggests that not only there are
political cycles in health spending but it does not seem to be a politically beneficial category of spend-
ing. Quantile regressions also suggest that states with higher per capita GDP tend to spend less on health
than states with lower per capita GDP. For social expenditure, under all regression specifications except
the panel data ones, BJP has a negative and significant effect. We find similar effect of Congress, but it
vanishes under regressions using panel data methods.
For irrigation expenditure, the results vary a lot according to specifications used. Hence, it is difficult to
say anything conclusively. The expenditure on agriculture is negatively affected by the variable ‘alternate’
suggesting an anti incumbency effect. Having a low degree of political cohesiveness also has a negative
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Table 1: Education Regressions-Different Error Processes1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Reg iid Reg cor Reg AR1 cor Reg AR1 psarcor FGLSAR1 FGLSCAR
lnpcsgdp -0.572 -0.572 -0.445 -0.523 -0.445 -0.304∗
(0.357) (0.338) (0.303) (0.280) (0.311) (0.119)
left 0.524 0.524 0.355 0.411 0.355 0.299
(0.526) (0.622) (0.547) (0.482) (0.460) (0.177)
bjp -0.0734 -0.0734 -0.0883 -0.109 -0.0883 -0.193
(0.457) (0.386) (0.351) (0.352) (0.401) (0.107)
congress 0.292 0.292 0.213 0.226 0.213 -0.0149
(0.374) (0.347) (0.319) (0.307) (0.329) (0.109)
regional -0.321 -0.321 -0.266 -0.308 -0.266 -0.320∗
(0.420) (0.427) (0.381) (0.374) (0.367) (0.149)
coalitio 0.234 0.234 0.199 0.179 0.199 0.146
(0.324) (0.369) (0.330) (0.330) (0.286) (0.108)
election 0.118 0.118 0.0812 0.123 0.0812 -0.0303
(0.262) (0.288) (0.300) (0.261) (0.264) (0.0795)
effectvt 0.216∗ 0.216∗ 0.179∗ 0.218∗∗ 0.179∗ 0.157∗∗∗
(0.0860) (0.0888) (0.0779) (0.0776) (0.0749) (0.0390)
margin 0.00408 0.00408 0.00369 -0.00137 0.00369 0.00675
(0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0113) (0.0107) (0.0112) (0.00461)
alternat -0.339 -0.339 -0.342 -0.325 -0.342 -0.283∗∗∗
(0.234) (0.229) (0.208) (0.186) (0.207) (0.0632)
L.education 0.775∗∗∗ 0.775∗∗∗ 0.822∗∗∗ 0.805∗∗∗ 0.822∗∗∗ 0.843∗∗∗
(0.0365) (0.0499) (0.0448) (0.0460) (0.0322) (0.0194)
Constant 8.669∗ 8.669∗∗ 6.812∗ 7.762∗∗ 6.812∗ 5.301∗∗∗
(3.395) (3.228) (2.875) (2.677) (2.961) (1.144)
Observations 323 323 323 323 323 323
r2 0.741 0.741 0.796 0.944
chi2 888.9 713.2 1018.3 967.4 1244.4 8370.3
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 2: Education Regressions-Different Error Processes2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Reg iid Reg cor Reg AR1 cor Reg AR1 psarcor FGLSAR1 FGLSCAR
lnpcsgdp -0.735∗ -0.735∗ -0.589 -0.653∗ -0.589 -0.435∗∗∗
(0.360) (0.342) (0.312) (0.307) (0.319) (0.123)
left 0.378 0.378 0.247 0.359 0.247 0.214
(0.525) (0.625) (0.555) (0.486) (0.465) (0.163)
bjp -0.120 -0.120 -0.131 -0.134 -0.131 -0.224∗
(0.456) (0.378) (0.348) (0.354) (0.405) (0.102)
congress 0.234 0.234 0.171 0.190 0.171 -0.0428
(0.373) (0.341) (0.315) (0.301) (0.333) (0.108)
regional -0.266 -0.266 -0.223 -0.288 -0.223 -0.271
(0.416) (0.418) (0.377) (0.370) (0.369) (0.142)
coalitio -0.00417 -0.00417 0.0269 0.00374 0.0269 -0.0800
(0.362) (0.400) (0.361) (0.361) (0.324) (0.122)
election 0.127 0.127 0.0887 0.140 0.0887 -0.00366
(0.262) (0.283) (0.294) (0.258) (0.263) (0.0731)
effectst 0.383∗∗ 0.383∗∗ 0.307∗ 0.334∗∗ 0.307∗ 0.304∗∗∗
(0.141) (0.135) (0.120) (0.116) (0.125) (0.0614)
margin 0.00683 0.00683 0.00593 0.0000604 0.00593 0.00833
(0.0129) (0.0134) (0.0119) (0.0112) (0.0114) (0.00485)
alternat -0.336 -0.336 -0.342 -0.306 -0.342 -0.272∗∗∗
(0.234) (0.228) (0.210) (0.189) (0.210) (0.0604)
L.education 0.760∗∗∗ 0.760∗∗∗ 0.805∗∗∗ 0.786∗∗∗ 0.805∗∗∗ 0.824∗∗∗
(0.0379) (0.0525) (0.0477) (0.0482) (0.0340) (0.0216)
Constant 10.37∗∗ 10.37∗∗ 8.380∗∗ 9.322∗∗ 8.380∗∗ 6.720∗∗∗
(3.411) (3.282) (2.981) (2.913) (3.021) (1.205)
Observations 323 323 323 323 323 323
r2 0.742 0.742 0.790 0.937
chi2 893.0 795.1 1054.7 942.3 1208.0 8583.6
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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effect on agricultural expenditure.
Saez and Sinha (2009) do not control for per capita state real GDP in their analysis. We do that in our
analysis above as well as a separately below to see if doing so has any significant impact on the overall
estimates. The results for education expenditure are given in Table 3 and for the other expenditure cat-
egories in the appendix. We find that overall per capita real GDP is almost always significant. However,
note that its coefficient has a semi-elasticity interpretation as we used log transformed per capita GDP
figures as a regressor. Additionally, we also find that inclusion of lagged dependent variable as a regres-
sor reduces the coefficient on degree of political cohesiveness. This suggests that there is some history
dependence in all the expenditure categories and when the given regression does not account for it, the
impact is absorbed by degree of political cohesiveness.
One could potentially include a lagged dependent variable as a regressor in the panel data regressions.
But doing so, complicates the estimation process substantially because of endogeneity issues. A way out
is to use Arellano-Bond kind of an estimator, but this estimator was developed for short panels where
the number of individuals on which we have observations are substantially greater than the time periods.
There have been some simulation studies that have shown that application of this estimator to long pan-
els type data leads to significant bias in estimation (Baltagi (2008)). Hence, we do not run regressions of
these expenditures on their lagged values under panel data fixed and random effects estimation.
3.2. Quantile Regression
Following Alexander et al. (2011,) we also ran a quantile regression on 25th, 50th, and 75th of education and
health expenditure data conditional on the state GDP data. A quantile regression is a good way of under-
standing the partial effect of an explanatory variable on various segments of a population (Wooldridge
(2011)). Thus running such a regression gives us yet another way of understanding the differences in
spending patterns conditional on the state’s per capita income. It allows us to see if the given category of
spending is sensitive to where the state lies in the spending hierarchy. The substantial regional inequality
in India only underscores the need to look at such variation in spending patterns. The complete tables
are in Appendix 3 and the results are summarized here. We interpret the coefficients in such regressions
noting the fact that quantile coefficients refer to effects on distributions and not on individuals (Angrist
and Pischke, 2009, p.281). For example, if having less political cohesiveness affects the spending nega-
tively in a particular quantile, it means that the states with lower political cohesiveness in that quantile
would experience a decline in spending than states in the same quantile but having higher cohesiveness.
It does not mean that a particular state with income in the given quantile is going to experience a decline
in spending.
For the regression of education expenditure, the variable ‘left’ is a significant and positive predictor
under all the quantiles and so are the two measures of political cohesiveness. Having a left leaning party in
the government has similar positive effect across quantiles. Similarly political cohesiveness as measured
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Table 3: Education Regressions-Per Capita SGDP and LDV 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reg AR1 psarcor Reg AR2 psarcor Reg AR3 psarcor Reg AR4 psarcor
left 1.455 0.130 1.772∗ 0.359
(0.825) (0.461) (0.812) (0.486)
bjp -0.967 -0.404 -0.222 -0.134
(0.553) (0.319) (0.607) (0.354)
congress -0.0999 0.0518 0.169 0.190
(0.493) (0.287) (0.510) (0.301)
regional -1.683∗ -0.475 -1.374 -0.288
(0.753) (0.365) (0.743) (0.370)
coalitio 0.0339 0.0613 -0.0219 0.00374
(0.551) (0.359) (0.539) (0.361)
election 0.141 0.133 0.130 0.140
(0.206) (0.265) (0.208) (0.258)
effectst 0.501 0.259∗ 0.741∗∗ 0.334∗∗
(0.262) (0.106) (0.229) (0.116)
margin -0.00494 0.00217 -0.0140 0.0000604
(0.0213) (0.0115) (0.0215) (0.0112)
alternat -0.408 -0.404∗ -0.391 -0.306
(0.323) (0.187) (0.335) (0.189)
L.education 0.819∗∗∗ 0.786∗∗∗
(0.0464) (0.0482)
lnpcsgdp -2.290∗∗∗ -0.653∗
(0.674) (0.307)
Constant 19.84∗∗∗ 3.245∗∗∗ 39.33∗∗∗ 9.322∗∗
(0.860) (0.867) (5.731) (2.913)
Observations 340 323 340 323
r2 0.848 0.921 0.864 0.937
chi2 28.72 985.0 51.54 942.3
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 4: Education Regressions-Per Capita SGDP and LDV 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reg AR1 psarcor Reg AR2 psarcor Reg AR3 psarcor Reg AR4 psarcor
left 1.728∗ 0.202 1.882∗ 0.411
(0.730) (0.457) (0.736) (0.482)
bjp -1.042 -0.363 -0.388 -0.109
(0.532) (0.307) (0.603) (0.352)
congress -0.0576 0.0905 0.0867 0.226
(0.473) (0.288) (0.503) (0.307)
regional -1.585∗ -0.480 -1.497∗ -0.308
(0.768) (0.372) (0.756) (0.374)
coalitio 0.428 0.164 0.403 0.179
(0.506) (0.327) (0.492) (0.330)
election 0.0900 0.124 0.0762 0.123
(0.209) (0.267) (0.211) (0.261)
effectvt 0.444∗ 0.195∗∗ 0.474∗∗ 0.218∗∗
(0.184) (0.0752) (0.178) (0.0776)
margin -0.00455 0.000267 -0.0112 -0.00137
(0.0207) (0.0110) (0.0211) (0.0107)
alternat -0.550 -0.400∗ -0.506 -0.325
(0.335) (0.183) (0.349) (0.186)
L.education 0.828∗∗∗ 0.805∗∗∗
(0.0450) (0.0460)
lnpcsgdp -2.124∗∗ -0.523
(0.665) (0.280)
Constant 19.52∗∗∗ 2.938∗∗∗ 38.04∗∗∗ 7.762∗∗
(0.793) (0.844) (5.877) (2.677)
Observations 340 323 340 323
r2 0.881 0.931 0.899 0.944
chi2 37.83 968.0 67.11 967.4
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 5: Education Regressions-Fixed Effects vs. Random Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
edu regar1 edu regar2 edu regar3 edu regar4
lnpcsgdp -1.568 -1.550 -2.343∗∗ -2.326∗∗
(1.059) (1.045) (0.828) (0.808)
left -1.751 -1.781 0.0867 -0.0469
(1.138) (1.138) (0.941) (0.937)
bjp -0.554 -0.503 -0.368 -0.347
(0.784) (0.778) (0.744) (0.738)
congress -0.297 -0.236 0.0359 0.131
(0.586) (0.584) (0.557) (0.554)
regional -1.569 -1.507 -1.659∗ -1.482∗
(0.810) (0.802) (0.748) (0.739)
election 0.136 0.154 0.0894 0.127
(0.203) (0.203) (0.205) (0.205)
coalitio -0.129 -0.288 0.136 -0.280
(0.469) (0.504) (0.458) (0.496)
effectvt 0.185 0.370∗
(0.202) (0.174)
margin -0.0301 -0.0285 -0.0260 -0.0193
(0.0211) (0.0215) (0.0203) (0.0205)
alternat -0.390 -0.345 -0.365 -0.261
(0.357) (0.349) (0.335) (0.329)
effectst 0.294 0.746∗∗
(0.299) (0.254)
Constant 34.86∗∗∗ 34.65∗∗∗ 40.58∗∗∗ 39.85∗∗∗
(4.476) (4.520) (7.283) (7.138)
Observations 323 323 340 340
r2
Wald
chi2 27.07 33.08
F 1.426 1.487
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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by effective number of parties according to seats has a uniform effect on education spending. Lower
cohesiveness is associated with uniformly higher spending across quantiles. Per capita state GDP is a
significant negative predictor but again the interpretation of the coefficient being that of a semi elasticity.
For the regression of health expenditure, variables, ‘left’ and per capita state GDP are significant and
positive and negative predictors respectively. Only one of the measures of political cohesiveness, ‘effectvt’
is negatively related to the health expenditure across quantiles. Lower cohesiveness means a decrease in
health care spending. However, for none of the quantiles dealt with here, election is a significant variable.
For irrigation expenditure, there is evidence that presence of a regional party in the government leads
to an increase in this expenditure. A Congress party government is also negatively associated with health
expenditure and so is the coalition dummy. A BJP government is negatively associated with social expen-
diture. This was true under the TSCS regressions as well. Political cohesiveness as measured by vote share
is negatively associated with agricultural expenditure across all quantiles. The variable ’margin’ however
is positively associated with expenditure on agriculture. This suggests that larger the difference in votes
of the largest recipient and the second largest one, higher would be the expenditure on agriculture.
Under quantile regressions, it is actually interesting to see how the coefficients on regressors behave
across quantiles. For example, in case of education expenditure regressions the coefficient on ‘effectvt’
jumps a bit from the lowest quantile to the higher quantile (graph in third row and first column). This sug-
gests a higher impact of political cohesiveness in states with higher spending levels. The following figure
shows the effect for all the quantiles for the regression of education expenditure and similar figures are
included for other expenditure categories in the appendix. The coefficient on ‘left’ shows a dip at higher
levels of expenditure for irrigation expenditure, signifying its lower influence in higher spending states. It
remains fairly constant for health expenditure across quantiles suggesting that the left’s influence is not
sensitive to the level of this category of state spending. However, the effect of political cohesiveness as
measured by vote share has a negative effect and its intensity increases as we move to higher quantiles.
For agriculture expenditure, ‘margin’ has a positive effect mostly for mid range quantiles than at the tails.
For social expenditure, the intensity of the negative effect of a BJP party government intensifies as we
move to higher quantiles.
One reason why education might be looked at favorably than other variables is that it could be shown
to be more lumpy and visible. Saez and Sinha (2009) argue this to be the case because of anti incumbency
bias creating additional political uncertainty. Secondly, because of clear increasing returns to education
in a liberalized economy, demand for increased resources devoted to it makes sense from the voters point
of view. Given this, it can be argued that by subjecting spending on education to discretionary changes
more than other variables, political parties are simply maximizing the probability of reelection. The the-
oretical model above implied that presence of credit constrained voters facing amplified aggregate risks
would give rise to coalition governments and lead to specific spending outcomes. The econometric anal-
ysis above does not completely vindicate the story but does lend some substantive support to the predic-
tions of the model. A summary of regression results is given in Table 8.
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Table 6: Education Regressions-Various Quantiles 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
edu OLS edu qreg 25 edu qreg 50 edu qreg 75 edu bsqreg 50
lnpcsgdp -3.305∗∗∗ -2.853∗∗∗ -3.257∗∗∗ -2.872∗∗∗ -3.257∗∗∗
(-6.63) (-4.28) (-5.64) (-4.52) (-4.89)
left 4.247∗∗∗ 4.113∗∗∗ 4.447∗∗∗ 3.450∗∗∗ 4.447∗∗∗
(5.68) (4.48) (5.21) (3.41) (6.94)
bjp 0.653 0.0779 0.533 1.139 0.533
(0.94) (0.09) (0.66) (1.29) (0.67)
congress 1.578∗∗ -0.0320 0.856 2.300∗∗ 0.856
(2.83) (-0.05) (1.33) (2.87) (1.43)
regional -0.442 -2.308∗∗ -0.821 1.137 -0.821
(-0.69) (-3.03) (-1.11) (1.30) (-1.04)
election 0.149 0.203 0.200 0.126 0.200
(0.37) (0.40) (0.43) (0.23) (0.47)
coalitio 1.226∗ 0.0200 0.125 0.715 0.125
(2.48) (0.03) (0.22) (1.05) (0.21)
effectvt 0.662∗∗∗ 0.440∗∗ 0.925∗∗∗ 1.097∗∗∗ 0.925∗∗∗
(5.20) (2.67) (6.27) (6.51) (4.82)
margin 0.00847 0.0382 0.0177 -0.0124 0.0177
(0.43) (1.60) (0.77) (-0.40) (0.68)
alternat 0.176 0.456 0.319 -0.464 0.319
(0.51) (1.07) (0.79) (-0.95) (0.85)
Constant 45.34∗∗∗ 41.29∗∗∗ 44.21∗∗∗ 41.91∗∗∗ 44.21∗∗∗
(10.33) (7.03) (8.71) (7.66) (7.73)
Observations 340 340 340 340 340
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 7: Education Regressions-Various Quantiles 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
edu psarcor edu qreg 25 edu qreg 50 edu qreg 75 edu bsqreg 50
left 0.130 2.517∗∗ 3.457∗∗∗ 3.331∗∗∗ 3.457∗∗
(0.28) (3.11) (3.37) (3.80) (3.08)
bjp -0.404 0.175 0.660 0.596 0.660
(-1.27) (0.23) (0.70) (0.80) (0.85)
congress 0.0518 -0.632 0.914 1.510∗ 0.914
(0.18) (-1.08) (1.21) (2.37) (1.67)
regional -0.475 -2.520∗∗∗ -0.704 1.159 -0.704
(-1.30) (-3.69) (-0.82) (1.70) (-1.11)
coalitio 0.0613 -1.816∗∗∗ -0.990 0.220 -0.990
(0.17) (-3.49) (-1.32) (0.33) (-1.36)
election 0.133 0.173 0.105 0.0480 0.105
(0.50) (0.39) (0.19) (0.10) (0.23)
effectst 0.259∗ 1.534∗∗∗ 1.601∗∗∗ 1.559∗∗∗ 1.601∗∗∗
(2.44) (9.01) (6.05) (6.72) (6.57)
margin 0.00217 0.0673∗∗ 0.0262 -0.0163 0.0262
(0.19) (3.31) (0.97) (-0.66) (1.13)
alternat -0.404∗ 0.502 0.413 0.564 0.413
(-2.16) (1.38) (0.87) (1.43) (1.07)
L.education 0.819∗∗∗
(17.65)
lnpcsgdp -2.895∗∗∗ -3.653∗∗∗ -4.074∗∗∗ -3.653∗∗∗
(-5.38) (-5.42) (-7.81) (-6.01)
Constant 3.245∗∗∗ 39.96∗∗∗ 47.34∗∗∗ 52.61∗∗∗ 47.34∗∗∗
(3.74) (8.46) (8.09) (11.62) (9.12)
Observations 323 340 340 340 340
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Figure 1: Behavior of coefficients on regressors across quantiles for Quantile Regression of education
expenditure
3.3. Likelihood of a Coalition Government
The theoretical model above is in the tradition of microfounded models in economics. It proposes that in
an equilibrium a certain type of government emerges to solve agents optimization problem. This is not
to say that agents in real world only have economic motives behind voting or they are only self interested.
The model only tries to capture some economic motivation behind the observed variation in political
cohesiveness. Having said this, it would be interesting to take this motivation to the data and analyze
factors the probability of a certain type of government emerging as a result of voting. In this section, we
use binary response models to do so.
Two economic factors proposed to influence voting in an economy by the model were endowment
shocks and credit constraints. We use the data on number of branch offices of nationalized banks in a
state and the credit deposit ratio as proxies for credit constraints. We also use per capita GDP at 2000
prices as a control variable for state’s income and population profile. There are several ways of estimating
a binary response model for panel data. We estimate the effect of these three variables on the likelihood
of having a coalition government for a state following various specifications as described in Wooldridge
(2011) .
It is clear from Table 9, that none of the variables are statistically significant affecting the probability of
a coalition government. However, except per capita state GDP, the other two variables have the expected
19
Table 8: Summary of TSCS-Panel Data and Quantile Regressions
Expenditure Category TSCS-Panel Data Quantile
Education Low Political Cohesiveness (+) Low Political Cohesiveness (+), Left (+)
Health Election (+) Left (+), Per Capita SGDP (-), Low Polit-
ical Cohesiveness (vote share) (-)
Irrigation Inconclusive Regional Party (-), Congress (-), Coali-
tion Dummy (-)
Social Expenditure BJP (Except Panel,( -)) BJP (-)
Agriculture Low Political Cohesiveness (-), Alternate (+), Margin (+), Low Political Cohesiveness
(vote share) (-)
sign. Higher number of per capita banks and a higher credit deposit ratio, both signify reduction in credit
constraints and therefore reduce the probability of having a coalition government. Assuming that lower
credit constraints go hand in hand with higher per capita incomes, one can argue that its effect is captured
in the other two variables. Accordingly we run the following regression with only number of banks per
capita and credit deposit ratio. The results are given in Table 9.
Dropping per capita state GDP as a regressor does not change the sign of the other two regressors
(Table 10). Further, in all but one specification, credit deposit ratio is a statistically significant predictor of
the change in the probability of having a coalition government. Higher the credit deposit ratio (lower the
credit constraints), lower is the probability of having a coalition government in a given state. This clearly
supports the message of the model above that credit constraints do play an important role in determining
the degree of political cohesiveness of a state government.
Along with the issue of statistical significance, among the various specifications above, which ones
would be appropriate to depend on? Table 11 provides information that answers this question. The
mean and the standard deviations are the same across these models. It is difficult to interpret models
which have a negative mean and predict values outside the [0, 1] interval. The random effects logit and
the probit models seem to have both these characteristics. On the other hand, the fixed effects logit,
Generalized Estimating equations (GEE) and OLS estimates have a mean and range both in [0, 1] interval.
We could argue that the results from these models are therefore more reliable than from the others.
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Table 9: Liklihood of having a coalition government
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
logitfe1 logitre1 logitpa1 probitre1 probitpa1 xtgee1 ols1
main
lnpcsgdp 1.809 1.059 0.519 0.532 0.328 0.107 -0.0242
(0.993) (0.822) (0.566) (0.464) (0.326) (0.0922) (0.0644)
pcbanks -26753.9 -10109.6 -5448.5 -5103.2 -3347.7 -822.6 -16.53
(24293.9) (15326.9) (9220.6) (8655.4) (5461.5) (1600.2) (838.4)
CD-ratio -0.0190 -0.0245 -0.0209 -0.0144 -0.0116 -0.00314 -0.00261∗
(0.0187) (0.0150) (0.0116) (0.00842) (0.00646) (0.00169) (0.00115)
Constant -9.281 -4.432 -4.687 -2.857 -0.504 0.559
(7.264) (4.995) (4.083) (2.877) (0.811) (0.546)
lnsig2u
Constant 1.039 -0.125
(0.607) (0.581)
Observations 220 320 320 320 320 320 320
ll -97.72 -138.6 -138.2 -158.0
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 10: Liklihood of having a coalition government
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
logitfe1 logitre1 logitpa1 probitre1 probitpa1 xtgee1 ols1
main
pcbanks -14713.0 -3912.8 -2840.4 -2015.0 -1650.9 -284.8 -115.4
(23098.5) (13753.6) (8744.8) (7869.6) (5164.2) (1491.9) (794.9)
CD-ratio -0.0347∗ -0.0289∗ -0.0231∗ -0.0165∗ -0.0123 -0.00346∗ -0.00266∗
(0.0169) (0.0145) (0.0117) (0.00822) (0.00638) (0.00165) (0.00114)
Constant -0.115 0.0420 -0.0935 -0.0628 0.413∗∗ 0.357∗∗∗
(1.358) (0.867) (0.774) (0.514) (0.149) (0.0862)
lnsig2u
Constant 0.894 -0.235
(0.598) (0.574)
Observations 220 320 320 320 320 320 320
ll -99.40 -139.5 -138.9 -158.1
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 11: Prediction summary of the binary response regressions
Variable Observations Mean Standard Dev. Min Max
Coalition 340 0.2471 0.4319 0 1
logitfe 320 0.05 0.0164 0.0111409 0.1099649
logitre 320 -2.010975 0.5857492 -3.497808 -0.6031956
logitpa 320 0.19949 0.0706421 0.0663225 0.4138539
probitre 320 -1.162138 0.3337106 -2.015521 -0.327044
probitpa 320 -0.1997806 0.0667124 0.0666815 0.3934107
xtgee 320 0.2 0.0690014 0.0200332 0.3552062
ols 320 0.2 0.053353 0.0680852 0.3078046
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4. Comments and Conclusion
The importance of credit constraints and negative aggregate shocks cannot be overstated given the recent
credit crisis. In this paper, I explore the role such factors can play in determining political outcomes and
how these political outcomes in turn can affect the economic ones. I do so by developing a simple model
of two period endowment economy with some of the agents being credit constrained and shocks making
the distribution of such agents endogenous. These agents seek to smooth consumption and use govern-
ment expenditure as an insurance mechanism to survive the shocks. They do so by voting for a political
entity which promises and has expertise in delivering the required public goods. We show that different
types of governments and therefore different spending policies could emerge in equilibrium conditional
on the realization of shocks. Thus, this microfounded model builds on the interaction between economic
and political factors to derive testable implications of the type of government on its spending policies.
The empirical analysis does lend support to the predictions of the model. Specifically, there exists a
strong evidence suggesting that a lower degree of political cohesiveness is associated with higher spend-
ing on education. We do not find similar evidence for its influence on other spending categories like
agriculture, irrigation or social services. In these cases, other political factors like presence of a particular
political party in the government or upcoming elections have a significant influence. These results are
obtained using variety of specifications and methodologies and hence have a built in robustness check.
It does remain a question worthy of exploration as to why politically less cohesive governments choose
spending on education for political maneuvering. We posit that suitability of education expenditure to
specifically target certain groups of voters explains the preference. However, a more disaggregate analysis
covering a lengthier time period might shed more light on this issue. Use of quantile regression clearly
shows that relationship between spending and political cohesiveness is also sensitive to distribution of
spending across states. For example, in case of education, we find that states with higher level of spending
are more sensitive to degree of political cohesiveness than with the lower ones.
One of the implications of the model is that the credit constraints interact with shocks to determine
equilibrium voting strategies of the agents. We take this issue to the data and ask how influential these
economic factors are in determining the probability of having a coalition government. The results sup-
port this hypothesis of the model. The econometric analysis suggests that higher the credit constraints
(as measured by lower credit deposit ratio), lower is the probability of having a coalition government. This
result should be taken with a pinch of salt as credit- deposit ratio is only a crude indicator of credit con-
straints. Commenting on the recent move towards increasing access to banking in India, Kamath et al.
(2010) find that having a bank account does not necessarily mean an easier access to credit from banks,
but having assets like land certainly do. A more richer analysis, therefore, should include data on asset
distribution and changes in landholding patterns over the years in different states. However, such a time
series data for different states in India is relatively harder to come by.
Notwithstanding the limitations imposed by the data availability, the theoretical and empirical exer-
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cise in this paper signifies a contribution to the literature on political economy and macroeconomics. Its
focus on interaction between credit constraints, aggregate shocks and voting is based on the intuition
that consumption smoothing should drive political decisions of the agents lacking access to formal in-
surance mechanisms in order to survive shocks to the economic activity. However, we do assume that
there are no credibility issues involved when it comes to implementing the promised policies. As a future
extension of this research one could explore the implications of relaxing this assumption.
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AA1. TSCS/Panel Data Regressions
Table 31: Social Expendtiure Regressions-Fixed Effects vs. Random Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Soc regar1 Soc regar2 Soc regar3 Soc regar4
lnpcsgdp 0.0230 -0.132 -1.422∗∗ -1.295∗
(0.880) (0.887) (0.540) (0.534)
left 0.130 0.0932 -0.0151 0.0241
(0.673) (0.692) (0.570) (0.582)
bjp -0.193 -0.473 -0.713 -0.837
(0.506) (0.516) (0.481) (0.488)
congress -0.407 -0.593 -0.626 -0.673
(0.372) (0.383) (0.359) (0.366)
regional -0.297 -0.560 -0.455 -0.610
(0.515) (0.526) (0.466) (0.470)
election -0.0570 -0.126 -0.0972 -0.146
(0.113) (0.116) (0.117) (0.119)
coalitio -0.000609 0.370 0.138 0.265
(0.305) (0.337) (0.299) (0.334)
effectvt -0.699∗∗∗ -0.470∗∗∗
(0.141) (0.114)
margin 0.0136 0.0157 0.0247 0.0256
(0.0143) (0.0149) (0.0139) (0.0142)
alternat 1.010∗∗∗ 0.793∗∗∗ 0.967∗∗∗ 0.838∗∗∗
(0.233) (0.233) (0.221) (0.222)
effectst -0.631∗∗ -0.382∗
(0.207) (0.166)
Constant 4.345∗ 4.621∗ 16.78∗∗∗ 14.85∗∗
(1.956) (2.071) (4.808) (4.725)
Observations 323 323 340 340
r2
Wald
chi2 48.15 35.87
F 4.367 2.702
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 12: Health Regressions-Different Error Processes1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Reg iid Reg cor Reg AR1 cor Reg AR1 psarcor FGLSAR1 FGLSCAR
lnpcsgdp -0.544∗∗ -0.544∗∗ -0.434∗ -0.402∗ -0.434∗ -0.421∗∗∗
(0.201) (0.209) (0.178) (0.166) (0.172) (0.0923)
left 0.462 0.462∗ 0.392∗ 0.375∗ 0.392 0.356∗∗∗
(0.281) (0.219) (0.191) (0.180) (0.241) (0.0877)
bjp 0.106 0.106 0.126 0.116 0.126 0.181∗
(0.250) (0.230) (0.206) (0.202) (0.216) (0.0827)
congress 0.218 0.218 0.169 0.160 0.169 0.0988
(0.204) (0.197) (0.172) (0.153) (0.176) (0.0573)
regional 0.261 0.261 0.231 0.192 0.231 0.127∗
(0.235) (0.198) (0.176) (0.188) (0.203) (0.0626)
coalitio 0.106 0.106 0.0673 0.0280 0.0673 -0.0377
(0.178) (0.181) (0.160) (0.140) (0.154) (0.0542)
election -0.583∗∗∗ -0.583∗∗∗ -0.583∗∗∗ -0.527∗∗∗ -0.583∗∗∗ -0.436∗∗∗
(0.146) (0.154) (0.154) (0.149) (0.144) (0.0564)
effectvt -0.0930 -0.0930 -0.0653 -0.0648 -0.0653 -0.0248
(0.0495) (0.0553) (0.0483) (0.0499) (0.0425) (0.0194)
margin 0.00214 0.00214 0.00124 -0.000698 0.00124 0.00134
(0.00717) (0.00888) (0.00755) (0.00644) (0.00616) (0.00257)
alternat 0.109 0.109 0.114 0.137 0.114 0.126∗
(0.128) (0.159) (0.142) (0.128) (0.111) (0.0493)
L.health 0.758∗∗∗ 0.758∗∗∗ 0.802∗∗∗ 0.804∗∗∗ 0.802∗∗∗ 0.811∗∗∗
(0.0337) (0.0589) (0.0536) (0.0493) (0.0294) (0.0237)
Constant 6.324∗∗∗ 6.324∗∗ 4.995∗∗ 4.737∗∗ 4.995∗∗ 4.648∗∗∗
(1.891) (2.058) (1.765) (1.681) (1.617) (0.908)
Observations 323 323 323 323 323 323
r2 0.749 0.749 0.792 0.859
chi2 925.6 476.5 608.4 603.6 1324.9 2501.8
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 13: Health Regressions-Different Error Processes2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Reg iid Reg cor Reg AR1 cor Reg AR1 psarcor FGLSAR1 FGLSCAR
lnpcsgdp -0.453∗ -0.453∗ -0.363∗ -0.318∗ -0.363∗ -0.400∗∗∗
(0.196) (0.206) (0.173) (0.155) (0.165) (0.0810)
left 0.436 0.436∗ 0.367 0.345 0.367 0.347∗∗∗
(0.287) (0.218) (0.188) (0.179) (0.243) (0.0853)
bjp 0.118 0.118 0.137 0.123 0.137 0.202∗
(0.252) (0.230) (0.203) (0.202) (0.214) (0.0822)
congress 0.203 0.203 0.153 0.135 0.153 0.0933
(0.206) (0.202) (0.173) (0.158) (0.176) (0.0566)
regional 0.185 0.185 0.174 0.129 0.174 0.103
(0.233) (0.201) (0.176) (0.196) (0.198) (0.0555)
coalitio 0.0237 0.0237 -0.00218 -0.0428 -0.00218 -0.0582
(0.200) (0.193) (0.170) (0.157) (0.172) (0.0545)
election -0.593∗∗∗ -0.593∗∗∗ -0.588∗∗∗ -0.538∗∗∗ -0.588∗∗∗ -0.460∗∗∗
(0.146) (0.156) (0.156) (0.151) (0.145) (0.0538)
effectst -0.0435 -0.0435 -0.0256 -0.0237 -0.0256 -0.00950
(0.0735) (0.0742) (0.0634) (0.0624) (0.0625) (0.0220)
margin 0.00123 0.00123 0.000525 -0.000826 0.000525 0.000943
(0.00721) (0.00905) (0.00758) (0.00646) (0.00611) (0.00257)
alternat 0.0962 0.0962 0.106 0.117 0.106 0.134∗∗
(0.129) (0.160) (0.142) (0.130) (0.111) (0.0465)
L.health 0.779∗∗∗ 0.779∗∗∗ 0.820∗∗∗ 0.824∗∗∗ 0.820∗∗∗ 0.824∗∗∗
(0.0318) (0.0570) (0.0516) (0.0468) (0.0273) (0.0214)
Constant 5.178∗∗ 5.178∗∗ 4.099∗ 3.709∗ 4.099∗∗ 4.308∗∗∗
(1.788) (1.922) (1.623) (1.450) (1.506) (0.768)
Observations 323 323 323 323 323 323
r2 0.746 0.746 0.794 0.858
chi2 913.1 456.8 602.9 578.1 1346.9 2905.4
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 14: Health Regressions-Per Capita SGDP and LDV 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reg AR1 psarcor Reg AR2 psarcor Reg AR3 psarcor Reg AR4 psarcor
left 0.498 0.194 0.599 0.345
(0.504) (0.170) (0.428) (0.179)
bjp -0.399 -0.0493 -0.199 0.123
(0.516) (0.182) (0.494) (0.202)
congress 0.147 0.0323 0.146 0.135
(0.337) (0.151) (0.339) (0.158)
regional -0.413 -0.0133 -0.369 0.129
(0.447) (0.199) (0.425) (0.196)
coalitio -0.0895 -0.0236 -0.0373 -0.0428
(0.335) (0.157) (0.315) (0.157)
election -0.301∗ -0.550∗∗∗ -0.334∗ -0.538∗∗∗
(0.150) (0.153) (0.146) (0.151)
effectst -0.233 -0.0157 -0.214 -0.0237
(0.171) (0.0629) (0.149) (0.0624)
margin 0.00919 -0.000224 0.00409 -0.000826
(0.0149) (0.00636) (0.0145) (0.00646)
alternat 0.383 0.0752 0.374 0.117
(0.260) (0.124) (0.252) (0.130)
L.health 0.844∗∗∗ 0.824∗∗∗
(0.0445) (0.0468)
lnpcsgdp -2.943∗∗∗ -0.318∗
(0.824) (0.155)
Constant 7.231∗∗∗ 0.867∗ 33.20∗∗∗ 3.709∗
(0.861) (0.395) (7.206) (1.450)
Observations 340 323 340 323
r2 0.562 0.857 0.586 0.858
chi2 15.38 487.1 29.76 578.1
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 15: Health Regressions-Per Capita SGDP and LDV 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reg AR1 psarcor Reg AR2 psarcor Reg AR3 psarcor Reg AR4 psarcor
left 0.458 0.188 0.833 0.375∗
(0.510) (0.175) (0.443) (0.180)
bjp -0.392 -0.0745 0.106 0.116
(0.505) (0.189) (0.460) (0.202)
congress 0.169 0.0319 0.383 0.160
(0.315) (0.152) (0.307) (0.153)
regional -0.165 -0.00107 0.283 0.192
(0.413) (0.199) (0.384) (0.188)
coalitio -0.0948 0.0131 0.0186 0.0280
(0.291) (0.141) (0.276) (0.140)
election -0.246 -0.549∗∗∗ -0.272 -0.527∗∗∗
(0.144) (0.152) (0.141) (0.149)
effectvt -0.472∗∗∗ -0.0319 -0.535∗∗∗ -0.0648
(0.122) (0.0468) (0.110) (0.0499)
margin 0.00532 0.0000957 -0.000415 -0.000698
(0.0140) (0.00630) (0.0132) (0.00644)
alternat 0.476∗ 0.0748 0.463∗ 0.137
(0.238) (0.120) (0.234) (0.128)
L.health 0.837∗∗∗ 0.804∗∗∗
(0.0456) (0.0493)
lnpcsgdp -2.998∗∗∗ -0.402∗
(0.711) (0.166)
Constant 8.608∗∗∗ 0.997∗ 34.94∗∗∗ 4.737∗∗
(0.877) (0.465) (6.294) (1.681)
Observations 340 323 340 323
r2 0.627 0.856 0.664 0.859
chi2 31.28 489.8 47.43 603.6
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 16: Health Regressions-Fixed Effects vs. Random Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hth regar1 Hth regar2 Hth regar3 Hth regar4
lnpcsgdp -3.593∗∗∗ -2.800∗∗∗ -3.222∗∗∗ -2.753∗∗∗
(0.707) (0.771) (0.494) (0.523)
left 0.366 0.288 0.689 0.611
(0.655) (0.652) (0.560) (0.579)
bjp -0.0109 -0.147 -0.0738 -0.136
(0.471) (0.477) (0.469) (0.481)
congress 0.238 0.167 0.391 0.357
(0.350) (0.355) (0.353) (0.361)
regional -0.489 -0.679 0.00373 -0.233
(0.484) (0.488) (0.457) (0.467)
election -0.251∗ -0.305∗∗ -0.298∗ -0.353∗∗
(0.113) (0.110) (0.122) (0.120)
coalitio -0.0479 0.0258 0.0558 -0.0243
(0.283) (0.311) (0.293) (0.329)
effectvt -0.429∗∗∗ -0.504∗∗∗
(0.127) (0.107)
margin -0.00475 -0.00113 0.000649 0.00205
(0.0130) (0.0137) (0.0133) (0.0139)
alternat 0.691∗∗ 0.550∗ 0.483∗ 0.365
(0.216) (0.216) (0.215) (0.218)
effectst -0.145 -0.207
(0.191) (0.164)
Constant 39.39∗∗∗ 30.95∗∗∗ 36.73∗∗∗ 31.26∗∗∗
(2.314) (2.139) (4.376) (4.631)
Observations 323 323 340 340
r2
Wald
chi2 89.25 52.35
F 5.880 3.317
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 17: Irrigation Regressions-Different Error Processes1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pooled OLS iid Pooled OLS cor Reg AR1 cor Reg AR1 psarcor FGLSAR1 FGLSCAR
lnpcsgdp 0.0926 0.0926 0.126 0.0678 0.126 0.220
(0.297) (0.325) (0.334) (0.326) (0.300) (0.125)
left -0.488 -0.488 -0.550 -0.491 -0.550 -0.481∗∗∗
(0.451) (0.453) (0.464) (0.464) (0.455) (0.0826)
bjp -0.0566 -0.0566 -0.0636 0.0546 -0.0636 0.0806
(0.389) (0.388) (0.399) (0.387) (0.392) (0.0874)
congress -0.375 -0.375 -0.422 -0.378 -0.422 -0.316∗∗∗
(0.328) (0.363) (0.373) (0.348) (0.330) (0.0945)
regional -0.559 -0.559 -0.612 -0.561 -0.612 -0.663∗∗∗
(0.390) (0.451) (0.463) (0.429) (0.393) (0.0922)
coalitio -0.336 -0.336 -0.359 -0.403 -0.359 -0.349∗∗∗
(0.278) (0.305) (0.310) (0.306) (0.280) (0.0451)
election 0.558∗ 0.558∗ 0.543∗ 0.574∗∗ 0.543∗ 0.469∗∗∗
(0.224) (0.233) (0.231) (0.200) (0.218) (0.0461)
effectvt -0.0300 -0.0300 -0.0273 -0.0436 -0.0273 0.00935
(0.0714) (0.0635) (0.0653) (0.0632) (0.0721) (0.0182)
margin 0.0189 0.0189 0.0192 0.0220 0.0192 0.0195∗∗∗
(0.0110) (0.0117) (0.0120) (0.0137) (0.0111) (0.00250)
alternat -0.150 -0.150 -0.152 -0.0409 -0.152 -0.308∗∗∗
(0.198) (0.210) (0.216) (0.220) (0.199) (0.0682)
L.irrigation 0.842∗∗∗ 0.842∗∗∗ 0.831∗∗∗ 0.833∗∗∗ 0.831∗∗∗ 0.832∗∗∗
(0.0320) (0.0488) (0.0503) (0.0524) (0.0322) (0.0186)
Constant 0.253 0.253 0.0470 0.541 0.0470 -1.075
(2.546) (2.899) (2.982) (2.801) (2.573) (1.116)
Observations 323 323 323 323 323 323
r2 0.771 0.771 0.757 0.818
chi2 1047.9 640.9 594.4 750.8 1009.6 13689.3
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 18: Irrigation Regressions-Different Error Processes2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pooled OLS iid Pooled OLS cor Reg AR1 cor Reg AR1 psarcor FGLSAR1 FGLSCAR
lnpcsgdp 0.106 0.106 0.138 0.0985 0.138 0.191
(0.296) (0.317) (0.325) (0.326) (0.298) (0.121)
left -0.441 -0.441 -0.505 -0.446 -0.505 -0.433∗∗∗
(0.457) (0.460) (0.471) (0.461) (0.461) (0.0901)
bjp -0.0450 -0.0450 -0.0529 0.0757 -0.0529 0.0843
(0.389) (0.385) (0.395) (0.382) (0.392) (0.0979)
congress -0.355 -0.355 -0.403 -0.341 -0.403 -0.294∗∗
(0.329) (0.368) (0.377) (0.353) (0.331) (0.0992)
regional -0.558 -0.558 -0.609 -0.566 -0.609 -0.601∗∗∗
(0.388) (0.449) (0.460) (0.425) (0.390) (0.0899)
coalitio -0.261 -0.261 -0.285 -0.297 -0.285 -0.281∗∗∗
(0.314) (0.340) (0.346) (0.341) (0.315) (0.0469)
election 0.556∗ 0.556∗ 0.541∗ 0.573∗∗ 0.541∗ 0.454∗∗∗
(0.224) (0.234) (0.232) (0.201) (0.218) (0.0448)
effectst -0.0751 -0.0751 -0.0716 -0.106 -0.0716 -0.0389
(0.112) (0.0899) (0.0918) (0.101) (0.113) (0.0213)
margin 0.0184 0.0184 0.0186 0.0209 0.0186 0.0191∗∗∗
(0.0110) (0.0116) (0.0119) (0.0138) (0.0111) (0.00255)
alternat -0.145 -0.145 -0.147 -0.0312 -0.147 -0.254∗∗∗
(0.198) (0.211) (0.216) (0.221) (0.199) (0.0753)
L.irrigation 0.843∗∗∗ 0.843∗∗∗ 0.832∗∗∗ 0.832∗∗∗ 0.832∗∗∗ 0.829∗∗∗
(0.0319) (0.0487) (0.0502) (0.0526) (0.0321) (0.0176)
Constant 0.175 0.175 -0.0162 0.336 -0.0162 -0.716
(2.500) (2.787) (2.865) (2.758) (2.525) (1.066)
Observations 323 323 323 323 323 323
r2 0.771 0.771 0.757 0.820
chi2 1049.1 640.7 594.9 759.8 1011.7 12817.9
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 19: Irrigation Regressions-Per Capita SGDP and LDV 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reg AR1 psarcor Reg AR2 psarcor Reg AR3 psarcor Reg AR4 psarcor
left -1.871∗∗ -0.403 -2.119∗∗∗ -0.446
(0.625) (0.451) (0.610) (0.461)
bjp 0.322 0.104 -0.159 0.0757
(0.689) (0.402) (0.670) (0.382)
congress -1.465∗ -0.318 -1.746∗∗ -0.341
(0.585) (0.356) (0.561) (0.353)
regional -0.815 -0.519 -1.320 -0.566
(0.718) (0.414) (0.728) (0.425)
coalitio -0.974∗ -0.306 -0.897∗ -0.297
(0.431) (0.341) (0.432) (0.341)
election 0.127 0.575∗∗ 0.132 0.573∗∗
(0.162) (0.201) (0.163) (0.201)
effectst 0.121 -0.101 0.0636 -0.106
(0.191) (0.100) (0.193) (0.101)
margin 0.0349 0.0205 0.0376 0.0209
(0.0203) (0.0138) (0.0200) (0.0138)
alternat -0.255 -0.0176 -0.223 -0.0312
(0.362) (0.208) (0.366) (0.221)
L.irrigation 0.837∗∗∗ 0.832∗∗∗
(0.0502) (0.0526)
lnpcsgdp 1.832∗ 0.0985
(0.912) (0.326)
Constant 5.552∗∗∗ 1.132 -10.18 0.336
(0.921) (0.613) (8.057) (2.758)
Observations 340 323 340 323
r2 0.161 0.820 0.201 0.820
chi2 20.16 751.6 23.68 759.8
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 20: Irrigation Regressions-Per Capita SGDP and LDV 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reg AR1 psarcor Reg AR2 psarcor Reg AR3 psarcor Reg AR4 psarcor
left -1.855∗∗ -0.458 -2.099∗∗∗ -0.491
(0.627) (0.456) (0.611) (0.464)
bjp 0.286 0.0759 -0.205 0.0546
(0.687) (0.409) (0.663) (0.387)
congress -1.460∗ -0.359 -1.753∗∗ -0.378
(0.583) (0.350) (0.558) (0.348)
regional -0.932 -0.525 -1.411 -0.561
(0.708) (0.416) (0.724) (0.429)
coalitio -0.956∗ -0.403 -0.921∗ -0.403
(0.408) (0.306) (0.407) (0.306)
election 0.104 0.575∗∗ 0.111 0.574∗∗
(0.161) (0.200) (0.161) (0.200)
effectvt 0.228 -0.0434 0.216 -0.0436
(0.146) (0.0630) (0.139) (0.0632)
margin 0.0363 0.0217 0.0405∗ 0.0220
(0.0201) (0.0137) (0.0198) (0.0137)
alternat -0.295 -0.0317 -0.282 -0.0409
(0.374) (0.207) (0.375) (0.220)
L.irrigation 0.836∗∗∗ 0.833∗∗∗
(0.0504) (0.0524)
lnpcsgdp 1.873∗ 0.0678
(0.916) (0.326)
Constant 4.950∗∗∗ 1.094 -11.20 0.541
(0.961) (0.631) (8.126) (2.801)
Observations 340 323 340 323
r2 0.161 0.819 0.205 0.818
chi2 24.79 744.8 27.08 750.8
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 21: Irrigation Regressions-Fixed Effects vs. Random Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Irr regar1 Irr regar2 Irr regar3 Irr regar4
lnpcsgdp -1.391 -1.334 0.721 0.780
(1.093) (1.101) (0.831) (0.833)
left -1.358 -1.287 -1.419 -1.429
(0.934) (0.944) (0.823) (0.832)
bjp -0.371 -0.199 -0.0549 0.0307
(0.686) (0.689) (0.661) (0.664)
congress -1.486∗∗ -1.385∗∗ -1.480∗∗ -1.448∗∗
(0.507) (0.512) (0.489) (0.494)
regional -0.765 -0.590 -0.894 -0.794
(0.702) (0.705) (0.663) (0.666)
election 0.0635 0.110 0.0888 0.126
(0.159) (0.159) (0.161) (0.161)
coalitio -0.900∗ -1.018∗ -0.966∗ -1.011∗
(0.413) (0.449) (0.405) (0.444)
effectvt 0.461∗ 0.354∗
(0.188) (0.165)
margin 0.0422∗ 0.0362 0.0341 0.0306
(0.0191) (0.0197) (0.0186) (0.0190)
alternat -0.309 -0.155 -0.408 -0.296
(0.315) (0.311) (0.299) (0.296)
effectst 0.217 0.186
(0.275) (0.241)
Constant 16.29∗∗∗ 17.06∗∗∗ -2.130 -1.749
(3.088) (3.129) (7.351) (7.388)
Observations 323 323 340 340
r2
Wald
chi2 24.59 20.41
F 2.442 1.866
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 22: Agriculture Regressions-Different Error Processes1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pooled OLS iid Pooled OLS cor Reg AR1 cor Reg AR1 psarcor FGLSAR1 FGLSCAR
lnpcsgdp -0.586 -0.586 -0.530 -0.699 -0.530 -0.445∗∗
(0.413) (0.501) (0.480) (0.495) (0.390) (0.144)
left 0.342 0.342 0.343 0.442 0.343 0.368∗
(0.591) (0.400) (0.383) (0.409) (0.559) (0.175)
bjp 0.237 0.237 0.238 0.310 0.238 0.303∗∗
(0.543) (0.398) (0.381) (0.386) (0.514) (0.111)
congress 0.383 0.383 0.353 0.399 0.353 0.317∗∗∗
(0.445) (0.310) (0.296) (0.302) (0.422) (0.0902)
regional 0.357 0.357 0.340 0.392 0.340 0.359∗∗∗
(0.503) (0.354) (0.338) (0.348) (0.476) (0.101)
coalitio 0.380 0.380 0.355 0.460 0.355 0.370∗∗∗
(0.384) (0.361) (0.347) (0.348) (0.364) (0.0849)
election -0.609 -0.609 -0.604 -0.528 -0.604 -0.435∗∗∗
(0.315) (0.393) (0.396) (0.388) (0.311) (0.0747)
effectvt -0.207∗ -0.207∗ -0.190∗ -0.237∗∗ -0.190 -0.160∗∗∗
(0.104) (0.0907) (0.0865) (0.0879) (0.0986) (0.0277)
margin 0.0174 0.0174 0.0167 0.0169 0.0167 0.0152∗∗∗
(0.0156) (0.0124) (0.0119) (0.0117) (0.0148) (0.00348)
alternat 0.788∗∗ 0.788 0.757 0.915∗ 0.757∗∗ 0.580∗∗∗
(0.277) (0.405) (0.393) (0.400) (0.263) (0.0869)
L.agriculture 0.803∗∗∗ 0.803∗∗∗ 0.814∗∗∗ 0.814∗∗∗ 0.814∗∗∗ 0.840∗∗∗
(0.0308) (0.0640) (0.0617) (0.0598) (0.0292) (0.0193)
Constant 6.466 6.466 5.832 7.307 5.832 4.799∗∗∗
(3.740) (4.669) (4.473) (4.576) (3.527) (1.350)
Observations 323 323 323 323 323 323
r2 0.767 0.767 0.780 0.823
chi2 1024.1 235.3 255.8 258.7 1165.3 3581.1
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 23: Agriculture Regressions-Different Error Processes2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pooled OLS iid Pooled OLS cor Reg AR1 cor Reg AR1 psarcor FGLSAR1 FGLSCAR
lnpcsgdp -0.445 -0.445 -0.386 -0.475 -0.386 -0.361∗∗∗
(0.407) (0.487) (0.461) (0.465) (0.379) (0.106)
left 0.454 0.454 0.448 0.528 0.448 0.567∗∗∗
(0.602) (0.407) (0.383) (0.415) (0.562) (0.143)
bjp 0.274 0.274 0.274 0.336 0.274 0.397∗∗∗
(0.545) (0.404) (0.380) (0.387) (0.510) (0.0833)
congress 0.391 0.391 0.352 0.361 0.352 0.379∗∗∗
(0.448) (0.310) (0.291) (0.298) (0.420) (0.0731)
regional 0.253 0.253 0.243 0.250 0.243 0.328∗∗∗
(0.500) (0.337) (0.315) (0.323) (0.467) (0.0825)
coalitio 0.391 0.391 0.360 0.443 0.360 0.376∗∗∗
(0.434) (0.397) (0.376) (0.386) (0.407) (0.0600)
election -0.624∗ -0.624 -0.614 -0.547 -0.614∗ -0.569∗∗∗
(0.316) (0.397) (0.401) (0.395) (0.313) (0.0497)
effectst -0.215 -0.215 -0.195 -0.228 -0.195 -0.178∗∗∗
(0.159) (0.119) (0.113) (0.118) (0.148) (0.0296)
margin 0.0149 0.0149 0.0141 0.0147 0.0141 0.0125∗∗∗
(0.0157) (0.0124) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0146) (0.00229)
alternat 0.772∗∗ 0.772 0.735 0.839∗ 0.735∗∗ 0.664∗∗∗
(0.278) (0.412) (0.396) (0.405) (0.261) (0.0595)
L.agriculture 0.816∗∗∗ 0.816∗∗∗ 0.830∗∗∗ 0.832∗∗∗ 0.830∗∗∗ 0.852∗∗∗
(0.0298) (0.0653) (0.0621) (0.0607) (0.0279) (0.0170)
Constant 4.847 4.847 4.192 4.895 4.192 3.707∗∗∗
(3.608) (4.440) (4.198) (4.191) (3.355) (0.996)
Observations 323 323 323 323 323 323
r2 0.765 0.765 0.784 0.821
chi2 1015.2 257.0 288.1 300.3 1193.2 7340.1
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 24: Agriculture Regressions-Per Capita SGDP and LDV 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reg AR1 psarcor Reg AR2 psarcor Reg AR3 psarcor Reg AR4 psarcor
left -0.0898 0.394 -0.0483 0.528
(0.940) (0.421) (0.881) (0.415)
bjp 0.383 0.173 0.483 0.336
(0.941) (0.390) (0.984) (0.387)
congress 1.078 0.268 0.888 0.361
(0.693) (0.297) (0.697) (0.298)
regional -0.0927 0.0667 0.115 0.250
(0.803) (0.339) (0.804) (0.323)
coalitio 0.336 0.461 0.417 0.443
(0.633) (0.383) (0.606) (0.386)
election -0.338 -0.545 -0.348 -0.547
(0.316) (0.399) (0.312) (0.395)
effectst -0.579∗ -0.212 -0.549∗ -0.228
(0.234) (0.121) (0.219) (0.118)
margin 0.0321 0.0174 0.0314 0.0147
(0.0255) (0.0118) (0.0247) (0.0117)
alternat 2.082∗∗∗ 0.747 2.089∗∗∗ 0.839∗
(0.608) (0.395) (0.587) (0.405)
L.agriculture 0.841∗∗∗ 0.832∗∗∗
(0.0616) (0.0607)
lnpcsgdp -4.440∗ -0.475
(1.907) (0.465)
Constant 9.769∗∗∗ 0.723 48.52∗∗ 4.895
(1.740) (0.828) (16.73) (4.191)
Observations 340 323 340 323
r2 0.476 0.823 0.501 0.821
chi2 25.31 294.7 30.05 300.3
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 25: Agriculture Regressions-Per Capita SGDP and LDV 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reg AR1 psarcor Reg AR2 psarcor Reg AR3 psarcor Reg AR4 psarcor
left 0.262 0.246 0.519 0.442
(0.877) (0.410) (0.833) (0.409)
bjp 0.753 0.0849 0.939 0.310
(0.882) (0.392) (0.920) (0.386)
congress 1.356∗ 0.246 1.287 0.399
(0.676) (0.292) (0.680) (0.302)
regional 0.424 0.0902 0.831 0.392
(0.798) (0.344) (0.790) (0.348)
coalitio 0.296 0.445 0.360 0.460
(0.553) (0.350) (0.538) (0.348)
election -0.244 -0.533 -0.242 -0.528
(0.293) (0.396) (0.288) (0.388)
effectvt -1.053∗∗∗ -0.187∗ -1.132∗∗∗ -0.237∗∗
(0.229) (0.0797) (0.231) (0.0879)
margin 0.0195 0.0204 0.0170 0.0169
(0.0251) (0.0120) (0.0244) (0.0117)
alternat 2.329∗∗∗ 0.761 2.457∗∗∗ 0.915∗
(0.580) (0.389) (0.561) (0.400)
L.agriculture 0.831∗∗∗ 0.814∗∗∗
(0.0609) (0.0598)
lnpcsgdp -4.855∗∗ -0.699
(1.626) (0.495)
Constant 12.59∗∗∗ 1.021 55.30∗∗∗ 7.307
(1.788) (0.775) (14.91) (4.576)
Observations 340 323 340 323
r2 0.507 0.824 0.545 0.823
chi2 40.63 248.6 42.33 258.7
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 26: Agriculture Regressions-Fixed Effects vs. Random Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Agr regar1 Agr regar2 Agr regar3 Agr regar4
lnpcsgdp -5.368∗∗∗ -3.808∗ -7.252∗∗∗ -6.290∗∗∗
(1.470) (1.626) (1.162) (1.245)
left 0.644 0.580 0.389 0.416
(1.319) (1.315) (1.189) (1.222)
bjp 0.421 -0.0328 0.495 0.135
(0.956) (0.973) (0.954) (0.985)
congress 0.813 0.534 0.954 0.798
(0.709) (0.722) (0.708) (0.731)
regional -0.458 -1.011 -0.383 -0.900
(0.982) (0.993) (0.956) (0.981)
election -0.133 -0.271 -0.186 -0.328
(0.226) (0.221) (0.237) (0.234)
coalitio 0.434 0.864 0.360 0.577
(0.575) (0.634) (0.585) (0.659)
effectvt -1.070∗∗∗ -1.231∗∗∗
(0.259) (0.234)
margin 0.0149 0.0171 0.0222 0.0258
(0.0265) (0.0279) (0.0267) (0.0283)
alternat 2.751∗∗∗ 2.464∗∗∗ 2.650∗∗∗ 2.330∗∗∗
(0.439) (0.439) (0.431) (0.440)
effectst -0.653 -0.688
(0.390) (0.356)
Constant 58.21∗∗∗ 41.64∗∗∗ 76.43∗∗∗ 65.14∗∗∗
(4.554) (4.111) (10.27) (11.04)
Observations 323 323 340 340
r2
Wald
chi2 110.3 66.75
F 6.820 4.520
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 27: Social Expenditure Regressions-Different Error Processes1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Reg iid Reg cor Reg AR1 cor Reg AR1 psarcor FGLSAR1 FGLSCAR
lnpcsgdp -0.122 -0.122 -0.130 -0.207 -0.130 -0.0698
(0.215) (0.222) (0.224) (0.210) (0.213) (0.0395)
left -0.289 -0.289 -0.286 -0.144 -0.286 -0.254∗∗∗
(0.307) (0.178) (0.179) (0.202) (0.304) (0.0362)
bjp -0.552 -0.552∗∗ -0.555∗∗ -0.430∗ -0.555∗ -0.509∗∗∗
(0.285) (0.197) (0.199) (0.177) (0.282) (0.0446)
congress -0.451∗ -0.451∗ -0.451∗ -0.333 -0.451∗ -0.409∗∗∗
(0.228) (0.180) (0.182) (0.174) (0.225) (0.0353)
regional -0.240 -0.240 -0.238 -0.171 -0.238 -0.170∗
(0.260) (0.262) (0.264) (0.277) (0.258) (0.0760)
coalitio 0.0877 0.0877 0.0885 0.123 0.0885 0.0854∗∗∗
(0.198) (0.183) (0.184) (0.196) (0.196) (0.0205)
election -0.228 -0.228 -0.227 -0.225 -0.227 -0.222∗∗∗
(0.163) (0.177) (0.177) (0.171) (0.159) (0.0138)
effectvt -0.0542 -0.0542 -0.0555 -0.0834 -0.0555 -0.0521∗∗∗
(0.0520) (0.0558) (0.0563) (0.0546) (0.0515) (0.00977)
margin 0.00593 0.00593 0.00612 0.00570 0.00612 0.00715∗∗∗
(0.00796) (0.00913) (0.00921) (0.00873) (0.00788) (0.00165)
alternat 0.273 0.273 0.278 0.255 0.278 0.245∗∗∗
(0.144) (0.181) (0.182) (0.172) (0.142) (0.0197)
L.socialse 0.715∗∗∗ 0.715∗∗∗ 0.711∗∗∗ 0.701∗∗∗ 0.711∗∗∗ 0.722∗∗∗
(0.0365) (0.0786) (0.0791) (0.0818) (0.0361) (0.0146)
Constant 2.034 2.034 2.116 2.827 2.116 1.488∗∗∗
(1.921) (2.069) (2.089) (1.964) (1.903) (0.363)
Observations 323 323 323 323 323 323
r2 0.617 0.617 0.612 0.625
chi2 501.6 340.0 331.9 356.9 508.5 5784.7
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 28: Social Expenditure Regressions-Different Error Processes2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Reg iid Reg cor Reg AR1 cor Reg AR1 psarcor FGLSAR1 FGLSCAR
lnpcsgdp -0.0900 -0.0900 -0.104 -0.156 -0.104 -0.0425
(0.213) (0.216) (0.219) (0.212) (0.213) (0.0381)
left -0.274 -0.274 -0.268 -0.107 -0.268 -0.240∗∗∗
(0.312) (0.176) (0.179) (0.203) (0.311) (0.0361)
bjp -0.539 -0.539∗∗ -0.545∗∗ -0.403∗ -0.545 -0.495∗∗∗
(0.285) (0.198) (0.201) (0.188) (0.284) (0.0426)
congress -0.447 -0.447∗ -0.448∗ -0.304 -0.448∗ -0.400∗∗∗
(0.229) (0.179) (0.182) (0.180) (0.228) (0.0336)
regional -0.272 -0.272 -0.269 -0.184 -0.269 -0.202∗
(0.259) (0.249) (0.253) (0.280) (0.258) (0.0793)
coalitio 0.0524 0.0524 0.0517 0.0289 0.0517 0.0456∗
(0.225) (0.194) (0.197) (0.210) (0.224) (0.0219)
election -0.227 -0.227 -0.227 -0.225 -0.227 -0.222∗∗∗
(0.163) (0.178) (0.177) (0.171) (0.159) (0.0139)
effectst -0.0342 -0.0342 -0.0351 -0.0366 -0.0351 -0.0349∗∗
(0.0816) (0.0578) (0.0588) (0.0610) (0.0814) (0.0115)
margin 0.00574 0.00574 0.00610 0.00444 0.00610 0.00651∗∗∗
(0.00800) (0.00922) (0.00937) (0.00867) (0.00798) (0.00180)
alternat 0.264 0.264 0.272 0.252 0.272 0.238∗∗∗
(0.144) (0.182) (0.184) (0.175) (0.144) (0.0204)
L.socialse 0.719∗∗∗ 0.719∗∗∗ 0.712∗∗∗ 0.711∗∗∗ 0.712∗∗∗ 0.721∗∗∗
(0.0364) (0.0796) (0.0807) (0.0833) (0.0362) (0.0139)
Constant 1.625 1.625 1.760 2.118 1.760 1.153∗∗∗
(1.876) (1.934) (1.969) (1.876) (1.874) (0.342)
Observations 323 323 323 323 323 323
r2 0.616 0.616 0.607 0.619
chi2 499.3 334.2 319.1 328.4 495.3 6598.0
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 29: Social Expenditure Regressions-Per Capita SGDP and LDV 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reg AR1 psarcor Reg AR2 psarcor Reg AR3 psarcor Reg AR4 psarcor
left 0.0388 -0.163 0.0167 -0.107
(0.317) (0.167) (0.298) (0.203)
bjp -1.064∗∗∗ -0.489∗∗ -0.691∗ -0.403∗
(0.319) (0.166) (0.319) (0.188)
congress -0.731∗∗ -0.353∗ -0.654∗ -0.304
(0.272) (0.162) (0.270) (0.180)
regional -0.821 -0.261 -0.717 -0.184
(0.525) (0.247) (0.504) (0.280)
coalitio 0.303 0.0536 0.215 0.0289
(0.266) (0.200) (0.263) (0.210)
election -0.139 -0.227 -0.137 -0.225
(0.130) (0.171) (0.130) (0.171)
effectst -0.421∗∗ -0.0451 -0.329∗ -0.0366
(0.142) (0.0594) (0.129) (0.0610)
margin 0.0279 0.00448 0.0266 0.00444
(0.0147) (0.00869) (0.0147) (0.00867)
alternat 0.760∗∗ 0.236 0.733∗∗ 0.252
(0.284) (0.169) (0.276) (0.175)
L.socialse 0.722∗∗∗ 0.711∗∗∗
(0.0767) (0.0833)
lnpcsgdp -1.545∗∗ -0.156
(0.597) (0.212)
Constant 3.462∗∗∗ 0.801∗ 16.86∗∗ 2.118
(0.609) (0.342) (5.295) (1.876)
Observations 340 323 340 323
r2 0.207 0.621 0.226 0.619
chi2 27.66 278.3 32.59 328.4
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
43
A2. Quantile Regression Results-Figures
Figure 2: Behavior of coefficients on regressors across quantiles for Quantile Regression of Health expen-
diture
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Figure 3: Behavior of coefficients on regressors across quantiles for Quantile Regression of Agricultural
expenditure
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Figure 4: Behavior of coefficients on regressors across quantiles for Quantile Regression of Irrigation ex-
penditure
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Figure 5: Behavior of coefficients on regressors across quantiles for Quantile Regression of Social expen-
diture
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A3. Quantile Regression Results-Tables
48
Table 32: Health Regressions-Various Quantiles 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
hth OLS hth qreg 25 hth qreg 50 hth qreg 75 hth bsqreg 50
lnpcsgdp -2.560∗∗∗ -1.739∗∗∗ -1.979∗∗∗ -3.577∗∗∗ -1.979∗∗∗
(-8.55) (-5.35) (-6.34) (-7.65) (-6.19)
left 1.951∗∗∗ 2.198∗∗∗ 1.826∗∗∗ 2.305∗∗ 1.826∗∗∗
(4.35) (4.72) (3.86) (3.16) (4.24)
bjp -0.0411 0.375 0.115 0.239 0.115
(-0.10) (0.87) (0.26) (0.37) (0.39)
congress 0.869∗∗ 0.550 0.767∗ 1.332∗ 0.767∗
(2.60) (1.49) (2.16) (2.59) (2.11)
regional 1.270∗∗ 0.682 1.166∗∗ 1.911∗∗ 1.166∗∗
(3.32) (1.69) (2.89) (3.18) (3.00)
election -0.235 0.0826 -0.0750 -0.416 -0.0750
(-0.97) (0.32) (-0.29) (-1.10) (-0.38)
coalitio 0.705∗ -0.170 0.303 0.885 0.303
(2.38) (-0.58) (0.96) (1.93) (1.03)
effectvt -0.565∗∗∗ -0.356∗∗∗ -0.339∗∗∗ -0.666∗∗∗ -0.339∗∗∗
(-7.40) (-5.06) (-4.16) (-5.08) (-3.44)
margin 0.0277∗ 0.0264 0.00793 0.0125 0.00793
(2.35) (1.68) (0.64) (0.75) (0.46)
alternat -0.00453 0.0456 -0.147 -0.0488 -0.147
(-0.02) (0.21) (-0.67) (-0.14) (-0.63)
Constant 30.18∗∗∗ 21.28∗∗∗ 24.24∗∗∗ 40.51∗∗∗ 24.24∗∗∗
(11.47) (7.38) (8.83) (9.75) (8.22)
Observations 340 340 340 340 340
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 33: Health Regressions-Various Quantiles 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
hth psarcor hth qreg 25 hth qreg 50 hth qreg 75 hth bsqreg 50
left 0.194 2.271∗∗∗ 2.179∗∗∗ 1.764 2.179∗∗∗
(1.14) (4.65) (4.77) (1.90) (4.42)
bjp -0.0493 0.626 0.112 0.550 0.112
(-0.27) (1.39) (0.27) (0.67) (0.31)
congress 0.0323 0.751∗ 0.658 1.338∗ 0.658
(0.21) (2.05) (1.94) (2.06) (1.72)
regional -0.0133 0.686 0.896∗ 1.421 0.896∗
(-0.07) (1.70) (2.33) (1.88) (2.22)
coalitio -0.0236 -0.565 0.0350 0.262 0.0350
(-0.15) (-1.64) (0.10) (0.37) (0.08)
election -0.550∗∗∗ -0.0325 -0.0468 -0.312 -0.0468
(-3.60) (-0.12) (-0.19) (-0.65) (-0.25)
effectst -0.0157 -0.148 -0.162 -0.224 -0.162
(-0.25) (-1.46) (-1.37) (-0.77) (-1.19)
margin -0.000224 0.0241 0.0127 0.0326 0.0127
(-0.04) (1.50) (1.06) (1.51) (0.86)
alternat 0.0752 -0.148 -0.130 -0.213 -0.130
(0.61) (-0.64) (-0.62) (-0.49) (-0.63)
L.health 0.844∗∗∗
(18.97)
lnpcsgdp -1.485∗∗∗ -1.934∗∗∗ -3.698∗∗∗ -1.934∗∗∗
(-4.18) (-6.47) (-6.75) (-6.91)
Constant 0.867∗ 18.01∗∗∗ 22.88∗∗∗ 39.50∗∗∗ 22.88∗∗∗
(2.20) (5.76) (8.83) (8.28) (9.35)
Observations 323 340 340 340 340
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 34: Irrigation Regressions-Various Quantiles 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Irr OLS Irr qreg 25 Irr qreg 50 Irr qreg 75 Irr bsqreg 50
lnpcsgdp 2.557∗∗∗ 1.182∗∗∗ 1.751∗∗∗ 3.134∗∗∗ 1.751∗
(5.23) (4.67) (4.01) (6.76) (2.01)
left -4.453∗∗∗ -3.105∗∗∗ -4.218∗∗∗ -5.033∗∗∗ -4.218∗∗∗
(-6.07) (-8.16) (-6.55) (-7.79) (-5.20)
bjp -0.418 0.517 1.379∗ 0.129 1.379
(-0.61) (1.50) (2.28) (0.21) (1.65)
congress -2.823∗∗∗ -3.335∗∗∗ -3.100∗∗∗ -1.527∗∗ -3.100∗∗∗
(-5.16) (-12.52) (-6.43) (-3.03) (-4.53)
regional -4.568∗∗∗ -3.773∗∗∗ -4.671∗∗∗ -4.546∗∗∗ -4.671∗∗∗
(-7.29) (-12.61) (-8.41) (-7.41) (-5.32)
election 0.246 0.222 0.693 0.581 0.693
(0.62) (1.11) (1.95) (1.60) (1.57)
coalitio -1.644∗∗∗ -2.297∗∗∗ -2.488∗∗∗ -0.548 -2.488∗∗∗
(-3.40) (-9.68) (-5.80) (-1.23) (-3.36)
effectvt -0.00943 0.118 0.0243 -0.302∗∗ 0.0243
(-0.08) (1.75) (0.22) (-2.76) (0.11)
margin 0.0278 0.0232∗∗ -0.0113 -0.0224 -0.0113
(1.44) (2.76) (-0.65) (-1.17) (-0.41)
alternat -0.158 -0.634∗∗∗ 0.294 0.300 0.294
(-0.46) (-3.58) (0.97) (0.98) (0.61)
Constant -14.78∗∗∗ -5.026∗ -7.976∗ -17.37∗∗∗ -7.976
(-3.43) (-2.29) (-2.08) (-4.20) (-1.03)
Observations 340 340 340 340 340
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 35: Irrigation Regressions-Various Quantiles 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Irr psarcor Irr qreg 25 Irr qreg 50 Irr qreg 75 Irr bsqreg 50
left -0.403 -3.152∗∗∗ -3.843∗∗∗ -5.021∗∗∗ -3.843∗∗∗
(-0.89) (-7.80) (-4.50) (-7.61) (-4.38)
bjp 0.104 0.488 1.444 0.0692 1.444
(0.26) (1.35) (1.85) (0.11) (1.65)
congress -0.318 -3.377∗∗∗ -3.110∗∗∗ -1.930∗∗∗ -3.110∗∗∗
(-0.89) (-12.23) (-4.93) (-3.91) (-4.65)
regional -0.519 -3.615∗∗∗ -4.347∗∗∗ -4.635∗∗∗ -4.347∗∗∗
(-1.25) (-11.93) (-6.09) (-7.77) (-5.78)
coalitio -0.306 -2.314∗∗∗ -1.820∗∗ -0.514 -1.820∗
(-0.90) (-8.29) (-2.89) (-1.02) (-2.03)
election 0.575∗∗ 0.246 0.214 0.465 0.214
(2.87) (1.17) (0.47) (1.29) (0.49)
effectst -0.101 0.178 -0.287 -0.365∗ -0.287
(-1.01) (1.77) (-1.30) (-2.21) (-0.99)
margin 0.0205 0.0166 -0.00977 -0.0174 -0.00977
(1.48) (1.81) (-0.43) (-0.93) (-0.36)
alternat -0.0176 -0.484∗ 0.447 0.181 0.447
(-0.08) (-2.55) (1.13) (0.61) (0.91)
L.irrigation 0.837∗∗∗
(16.67)
lnpcsgdp 1.057∗∗∗ 1.881∗∗∗ 3.399∗∗∗ 1.881∗
(3.96) (3.33) (7.69) (2.23)
Constant 1.132 -3.930 -8.653 -19.77∗∗∗ -8.653
(1.85) (-1.72) (-1.76) (-5.09) (-1.18)
Observations 323 340 340 340 340
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 36: Agriculture Regressions-Various Quantiles 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Agr OLS Agr qreg 25 Agr qreg 50 Agr qreg 75 Agr bsqreg 50
lnpcsgdp -4.071∗∗∗ -2.136∗∗ -2.510∗∗∗ -5.842∗∗∗ -2.510∗
(-5.82) (-2.84) (-4.46) (-7.47) (-2.51)
left 0.457 1.381 0.0765 -0.699 0.0765
(0.44) (1.38) (0.09) (-0.59) (0.10)
bjp 0.394 -0.0675 -1.082 2.436∗ -1.082
(0.40) (-0.07) (-1.39) (2.20) (-0.85)
congress 2.356∗∗ 1.496 1.628∗∗ 1.715∗ 1.628∗
(3.01) (1.94) (2.62) (2.00) (2.39)
regional 1.725 0.944 0.113 -0.0906 0.113
(1.93) (1.05) (0.16) (-0.09) (0.15)
election 0.107 0.276 -0.119 0.109 -0.119
(0.19) (0.48) (-0.27) (0.17) (-0.22)
coalitio 1.283 0.370 -0.396 1.834∗ -0.396
(1.85) (0.57) (-0.73) (2.19) (-0.56)
effectvt -1.102∗∗∗ -0.576∗∗∗ -0.449∗∗ -0.838∗∗∗ -0.449∗
(-6.17) (-3.49) (-3.17) (-3.60) (-2.14)
margin 0.0883∗∗ 0.0506 0.150∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗
(3.20) (1.80) (6.92) (5.81) (6.90)
alternat 0.894 1.472∗∗ 0.239 0.658 0.239
(1.84) (3.15) (0.61) (1.18) (0.48)
Constant 46.36∗∗∗ 24.75∗∗∗ 30.30∗∗∗ 63.06∗∗∗ 30.30∗∗∗
(7.53) (3.69) (6.11) (9.01) (3.33)
Observations 340 340 340 340 340
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 37: Agriculture Regressions-Various Quantiles 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Agr psarcor Agr qreg 25 Agr qreg 50 Agr qreg 75 Agr bsqreg 50
left 0.394 1.210 -0.152 -0.918 -0.152
(0.94) (1.07) (-0.17) (-0.78) (-0.18)
bjp 0.173 0.00839 -1.508 1.100 -1.508
(0.44) (0.01) (-1.80) (1.02) (-1.21)
congress 0.268 1.371 1.089 1.862∗ 1.089
(0.90) (1.67) (1.61) (2.25) (1.37)
regional 0.0667 0.890 -0.757 -1.135 -0.757
(0.20) (0.95) (-0.99) (-1.19) (-0.97)
coalitio 0.461 -0.965 -0.518 2.033∗ -0.518
(1.20) (-1.26) (-0.80) (2.28) (-0.87)
election -0.545 0.162 -0.0329 0.0626 -0.0329
(-1.36) (0.25) (-0.07) (0.10) (-0.06)
effectst -0.212 0.0311 -0.244 -0.759∗ -0.244
(-1.76) (0.12) (-1.05) (-2.09) (-0.91)
margin 0.0174 0.0613∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗
(1.48) (2.03) (6.50) (6.67) (6.33)
alternat 0.747 0.960 0.287 0.544 0.287
(1.89) (1.88) (0.68) (0.96) (0.61)
L.agriculture 0.841∗∗∗
(13.65)
lnpcsgdp -2.017∗ -2.089∗∗∗ -5.071∗∗∗ -2.089∗
(-2.33) (-3.47) (-6.86) (-2.11)
Constant 0.723 21.88∗∗ 25.80∗∗∗ 54.65∗∗∗ 25.80∗∗
(0.87) (2.88) (4.93) (8.46) (2.94)
Observations 323 340 340 340 340
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 38: Social Expenditure Regressions-Various Quantiles 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Soc OLS Soc qreg 25 Soc qreg 50 Soc qreg 75 Soc bsqreg 50
lnpcsgdp -1.586∗∗∗ -0.0720 -0.721∗∗∗ -1.624∗∗∗ -0.721∗∗
(-5.21) (-0.76) (-5.00) (-4.24) (-3.15)
left -0.294 -0.535∗∗∗ -0.252 -1.458∗∗ -0.252
(-0.64) (-3.56) (-1.16) (-2.83) (-0.76)
bjp -1.386∗∗ -1.393∗∗∗ -0.962∗∗∗ -2.229∗∗∗ -0.962∗∗
(-3.27) (-9.68) (-4.80) (-4.95) (-2.94)
congress -0.532 -0.763∗∗∗ -0.359∗ -1.063∗∗ -0.359
(-1.57) (-6.65) (-2.23) (-2.87) (-1.19)
regional 0.0635 -0.675∗∗∗ -0.333 -0.397 -0.333
(0.16) (-5.26) (-1.81) (-0.90) (-0.95)
election -0.0824 0.0165 -0.0439 -0.246 -0.0439
(-0.33) (0.19) (-0.37) (-0.93) (-0.36)
coalitio -0.00127 0.160 0.160 -0.432 0.160
(-0.00) (1.41) (1.13) (-1.44) (0.68)
effectvt -0.169∗ -0.0132 -0.0312 -0.00897 -0.0312
(-2.17) (-0.45) (-0.85) (-0.10) (-0.45)
margin 0.0128 -0.00838 0.0141∗ 0.0323∗∗ 0.0141
(1.06) (-1.76) (2.48) (2.76) (1.48)
alternat 0.533∗ -0.00613 0.283∗∗ 0.656∗∗ 0.283
(2.52) (-0.09) (2.80) (2.62) (1.47)
Constant 17.18∗∗∗ 2.808∗∗∗ 8.442∗∗∗ 18.10∗∗∗ 8.442∗∗∗
(6.42) (3.37) (6.65) (5.44) (4.39)
Observations 340 340 340 340 340
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 39: Social Expendtiure Regressions-Various Quantiles 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Soc psarcor Soc qreg 25 Soc qreg 50 Soc qreg 75 Soc bsqreg 50
left -0.163 -0.527∗∗ -0.470 -1.711∗∗ -0.470
(-0.98) (-3.03) (-1.69) (-3.21) (-1.43)
bjp -0.489∗∗ -1.288∗∗∗ -1.160∗∗∗ -2.215∗∗∗ -1.160∗∗∗
(-2.95) (-7.71) (-4.57) (-4.72) (-3.58)
congress -0.353∗ -0.685∗∗∗ -0.438∗ -0.909∗ -0.438
(-2.18) (-4.87) (-2.13) (-2.38) (-1.52)
regional -0.261 -0.607∗∗∗ -0.444 -0.498 -0.444
(-1.06) (-4.03) (-1.90) (-1.09) (-1.24)
coalitio 0.0536 0.0706 -0.0441 -0.701 -0.0441
(0.27) (0.48) (-0.22) (-1.91) (-0.18)
election -0.227 -0.0448 -0.0615 -0.133 -0.0615
(-1.33) (-0.45) (-0.42) (-0.49) (-0.52)
effectst -0.0451 0.0918∗ 0.0717 0.218 0.0717
(-0.76) (2.11) (0.99) (1.42) (0.70)
margin 0.00448 -0.00945 0.0138 0.0162 0.0138
(0.52) (-1.63) (1.90) (1.38) (1.31)
alternat 0.236 -0.0420 0.215 0.381 0.215
(1.39) (-0.51) (1.69) (1.51) (1.07)
L.socialse 0.722∗∗∗
(9.40)
lnpcsgdp -0.156 -0.624∗∗∗ -1.554∗∗∗ -0.624∗∗
(-1.37) (-3.44) (-4.08) (-2.64)
Constant 0.801∗ 3.283∗∗ 7.509∗∗∗ 17.12∗∗∗ 7.509∗∗∗
(2.34) (3.32) (4.77) (5.27) (3.80)
Observations 323 340 340 340 340
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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A4. Description of variables in the regressions
Effective number of Parties (seats) The effective number of parties in a state assem-
bly in India, using seats (nSEATS), was calculated
employing the widely used Laakso and Taageperas
Index (N).
Effective number of Parties (votes) The effective number of parties in a state assem-
bly in India, using votes (nVOTES), was calculated
employing the widely used Laakso and Taageperas
Index (N).
Election Dummy variable taking value 0 or 1
Left Dummy variable taking value 0 if a leftist party is
not part of the government and 1 if it is.
BJP Dummy variable taking value 0 if Bharatiya Janata
Party is not part of the government and 1 if it is.
Congress Dummy variable taking value 0 if Congress is not
part of the government and 1 if it is.
Regional Dummy variable taking value 0 if a regional is not
part of the government and 1 if it is.
Coalition Dummy variable taking value 0 if state government
is not formed by coalition of parties and 1 if it is.
Alternation 0 = A state assembly is ruled by the same political
party that ruled in that state prior to the election 1 =
A state assembly is ruled by a political party that is
different from the political party that ruled in that
state prior to the election
margin Percentage difference between the largest recipi-
ent of votes and the second largest recipient of
votes in all state assembly elections in India, 1980-
2000.
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